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History of Lane's North Carolina Brigade.

By Brigadier-General JAMES H. LANE.

No. 7.

SUMMER CAMPAIGN OF 1862 (CONCLUDED)—EXTRACT FROM GENERAL JACKSON'S REPORT.

Warrenton Springs—On the 24th there was a fierce cannonade between General Hill's artillery and that of the enemy across the river.

Manassas Junction—Soon after the advance of the troops from Bristoe station reached the Junction, they were fired upon by a distant battery of the enemy, posted in the direction of the battlefield of Manassas. This artillery was driven off, and retreated in the direction of Centreville. Soon after, a considerable body of Federal infantry, under Brigadier-General Taylor, of New Jersey, came in sight—having, it is believed, that morning left Alexandria in the cars—and boldly pushed forward to recover the position and

stores which had been lost the previous night. The advance was made with great spirit and determination, and under a leader worthy of a better cause. Assailed by the batteries of Poague and Carpenter, and some of General Hill's division, and apparently seeing that there was danger of its retreat being cut off by our other troops if it continued to move forward, it soon commenced retreating, and, being subjected to a heavy fire from our batteries, was soon routed, leaving its killed and wounded upon the field. Several brigades of General Hill's division pressed forward in pursuit. In this conflict the Federal commander, General Taylor, was mortally wounded.

Battle of Manassas (on the 29th)—Assault after assault was made on the left, exhibiting on the part of the enemy great pertinacity and determination, but every advance was most successfully and gallantly driven back. General Hill reports that six separate and distinct assaults were thus met and repulsed by his division, assisted by Hays' brigade, Colonel Forno commanding. * * * (On the 30th) as Longstreet pressed upon the right, the Federal advance was checked, and soon a general advance of my whole line was ordered. Eagerly and fiercely did each brigade press forward, exhibiting in parts of the field scenes of close encounter and murderous strife not witnessed often in the turmoil of battle. The Federals gave way before our troops, fell back in disorder, and fled precipitately, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. During their retreat the artillery opened with destructive power upon the fugitive masses. The infantry followed until darkness put an end to the pursuit.

Ox Hill—The brigades of Branch and Field—Colonel Brockenbrough commanding the latter—were sent forward to feel and engage the enemy. A cold and drenching thunder shower swept over the field at this time, striking directly into the faces of our troops. These two brigades gallantly engaged the enemy, but so severe was the fire in front and flank of Branch's brigade as to produce in it some disorder and falling back. The brigades of Gregg, Thomas and Pender were then thrown into the fight. Soon a portion of Ewell's division became engaged. The conflict now raged with great fury, the enemy obstinately and desperately contesting the ground until their Generals Kearney and Stephens fell in front of Thomas' brigade, after which they retired from the field.

Harper's Ferry—On observing an eminence crowning the extreme left of the enemy's line, occupied by infantry, but without artillery,

and protected only by an abatis of fallen timber, Pender, Archer and Brockenbrough were directed to gain the crest of that hill, while Branch and Gregg were directed to march along the river, and, during the night, to take advantage of the ravines cutting the precipitous banks of the river and establish themselves on the plain to the left and rear of the enemy's works. Thomas followed as a reserve. The execution of the first movement was entrusted to Brigadier-General Pender, who accomplished it with slight resistance; and during the night Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, Chief of Artillery of Hill's division, brought up the batteries of Captains Pegram, McIntosh, Davidson, Braxton and Crenshaw, and established them upon the position thus gained. Branch and Gregg also gained the positions indicated for them, and daybreak found them in rear of the enemy's line of defence. * * * * *

In an hour the enemy's fire seemed to be silenced, and the batteries of General Hill were ordered to cease their fire, which was the signal for storming the works. General Pender had commenced his advance, when the enemy again opening, Pegram and Crenshaw moved forward their batteries, and poured a rapid fire into the enemy. The white flag was now displayed, and shortly afterwards Brigadier-General White (the commanding officer, Colonel D. S. Miles, having been mortally wounded), with a garrison of about eleven thousand men, surrendered as prisoners of war. Under this capitulation we took possession of seventy-three pieces of artillery, some thirteen thousand small arms and other stores. Liberal terms were granted to General White and the officers under his command in the surrender, which, I regret to say, do not seem, from subsequent events, to have been properly appreciated by their Government.

Sharpsburg—I refer you to the report of Major-General A. P. Hill for the operations of his command in the battle of Sharpsburg. Arriving upon the battlefield from Harper's Ferry at half-past two o'clock of the 17th, he reported to the Commanding-General, and was by him directed to take position on the right. I have not embraced the movements of his division, nor his killed and wounded of that action, in my report.

Shepherdstown—Early in the morning of the 19th we recrossed the Potomac river into Virginia near Shepherdstown. * * * * * On the same day the enemy appeared in considerable force on the northern side of the Potomac, and commenced planting heavy batteries on its heights. In the evening, the Federals commenced

crossing under the protection of their guns, driving off Lawton's brigade and General Pendleton's artillery. By morning a considerable force had crossed over. Orders were dispatched to Generals Early and Hill, who had advanced some four miles on the Martinsburg road, to return and drive back the enemy. General Hill, who was in the advance, as he approached the town, formed his line of battle in two lines, the first composed of the brigades of Pender, Gregg and Thomas, under the command of General Gregg, and the second of Lane's, Archer's and Brockenbrough's brigades, under command of General Archer. * * * * * The Federal infantry lined the high banks of the Virginia shore, while the artillery, formidable in numbers and weight of metal, crowned the opposite heights of the Potomac. General Hill's division advanced with great gallantry against the Federal infantry in the face of a continuous discharge of shot and shell from their batteries. The Federals, massing in front of Pender, poured a heavy fire into his ranks, and then extending with a view to turn his left, Archer promptly formed on Pender's left, when a simultaneous charge was made, which drove the enemy into the river, followed by an appalling scene of the destruction of human life. Two hundred prisoners were taken. This position, on the bank of the river, we continued to hold that day, although exposed to the enemy's guns and within range of his sharpshooters, posted near the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. Our infantry remained at the river until relieved by cavalry, under General Fitzhugh Lee. * * * We remained near Martinsburg until the 27th, when we moved to Bunker hill, in the county of Berkeley.

T. J. JACKSON, *Lieutenant-General.*

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL LEE'S REPORTS.

Warrenton Springs—General Jackson's command lay between that place (Jeffersonton) and the Springs ford, and a warm cannonade was progressing between the batteries of General A. P. Hill's division and those of the enemy.

Battle of Manassas—While this demonstration was being made on the right, a large force advanced to assail the left of Jackson's position, occupied by the division of A. P. Hill. The attack was received by his troops with their accustomed steadiness, and the battle raged with great fury. The enemy was repeatedly repulsed, but again pressed on the attack with great fury.

Ox Hill—The advance of Jackson's column encountered the

enemy at Ox hill, near Germantown, about 5 P. M. Line of battle was at once formed, and two brigades of A. P. Hill's division, those of Branch and Field, under Colonel Brockenbrough, were thrown forward to attack the enemy and ascertain his strength and position. A cold and drenching rain storm drove in the faces of our troops as they advanced and gallantly engaged the enemy. They were subsequently supported by the brigades of Gregg, Thomas and Pender, also of Hill's division, which, with part of Ewell's, became engaged. The conflict was obstinately maintained by the enemy until dark, when he retreated, having lost two general officers, one of whom, Major-General Kearney, was left dead on the field. Longstreet's command arrived after the action was over, and the next morning it was found that the enemy had conducted his retreat so rapidly that the attempt to intercept him was abandoned. * * * * *

Harper's Ferry—On the afternoon of the 14th, when he (Jackson) found that the troops of Walker and McLaws were in position to co-operate in the attack, he ordered General A. P. Hill to turn the enemy's left flank and enter Harper's Ferry. * * * General A. P. Hill, observing a hill on the enemy's extreme left, occupied by infantry, without artillery, and protected only by abatis of felled timber, directed General Pender, with his own brigade, and those of Archer and Colonel Brockenbrough, to seize the crest, which was done with slight resistance. At the same time he ordered Generals Branch and Gregg to march along the Shenandoah, and taking advantage of the ravines intersecting its steep banks, to establish themselves on the plain to the left and rear of the enemy's works. This was accomplished during the night. * * * * * The attack on the garrison began at dawn. A rapid and vigorous fire was opened from the batteries of General Jackson and those on Maryland and Loudoun heights. In about two hours the garrison, consisting of more than eleven thousand men, surrendered. Seventy-three pieces of artillery, about thirteen thousand small arms, and a large quantity of military stores, fell into our hands. Leaving General A. P. Hill to receive the surrender of the Federal troops and secure the captured property, General Jackson, with his two other divisions, set out at once for Sharpsburg, ordering Generals McLaws and Walker to follow without delay.

Sharpsburg—General A. P. Hill had arrived from Harper's Ferry, having left that place at half-past seven A. M. He was ordered to

reinforce General Jones, and moved to his support with the brigades of Archer, Branch, Gregg and Pender, the last of whom was placed on the right of the line, and the other three advanced and attacked the enemy, now flushed with success. Hill's batteries were thrown forward and united their fire with those of General Jones', and one of General D. H. Hill's also opened, with good effect, from the left of the Boonsboro' road. The progress of the enemy was immediately arrested, and his line began to waver. At this moment General Jones ordered Toombs to charge the flank, while Archer, supported by Branch and Gregg, moved upon the front of the Federal line. The enemy made a brief resistance, then broke and retreated in confusion towards the Antietam, pursued by the troops of Hill and Jones, until he reached the protection of the batteries on the opposite side of the river.

In this attack the brave and lamented Brigadier-General L. O'B. Branch was killed, gallantly leading his brigade.

Shepherdstown—General Pendleton was left to guard the ford with the reserve artillery and about six hundred infantry. That night the enemy crossed the river above General Pendleton's position, and his infantry support giving way, four of his guns were taken. A considerable force took position on the right bank under cover of their artillery, on the commanding hills on the opposite side. The next morning General A. P. Hill was ordered to return with his division and dislodge them. Advancing under a heavy fire of artillery, the three brigades of Gregg, Pender and Archer attacked the enemy vigorously and drove them over the river with heavy loss.

* * * *

R. E. LEE, *General.*

Casualties from Cedar Run to Shepherdstown.

	7th Regiment.			18th Regiment.			28th Regiment.			33d Regiment.			37th Regiment.			Total.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Cedar Run.....	2	1	15	3	23	6	30	2	13	12	83
Shelling on Rappahannock.....	3	3
Manassas Junction.....
Manassas Plains.....	7	61	2	12	7	37	1	1	8	13	67	30	185	1
Ox Hill.....	4	16	1	2	16	1	2	26	1	16	5	18	14	92	2
Harper's Ferry.....	4	4
Sharpsburg.....	9	43	4	8	14	2	3	16	4	20	79	4
Shepherdstown.....	15	2	26	1	16	10	4	3	71
Aggregate.....	20	141	5	15	83	1	13	112	1	11	80	20	106	79	353	7

On our march to Manassas Junction we had nothing to eat, and were turned into fields of green corn like so many horses. We similarly dieted when we first entered Maryland.

From Shepherdstown we went into camp at Bunker hill, and there remained until sent to North Mountain depot, near Hedgesville, to tear up the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. We did our work so thoroughly, that General Jackson complimented us, and ordered us back to Bunker hill to rest, while the balance of his command was destroying the road between Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry. We also helped to tear up the Winchester and Charlestown or Harper's Ferry road.

We next camped at *Castleman's Ferry, in Clarke county*, where we did picket duty for some time. And then near Winchester, where we remained until our corps was ordered to Fredericksburg. Here we camped but a short time before we were called upon to take an active part in the great battle of Fredericksburg.

Operations of General J. E. B. Stuart before Chancellorsville.

By Adjutant R. T. HUBARD, of the Third Virginia Cavalry.

The following extract was clipped from the Richmond (Virginia) *Daily Whig*, of July 31, 1879:

MAHONE AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.

[Colonel William E. Cameron, in Philadelphia Weekly Times.]

Meantime, what of the army thus beset and imperilled? We have said that General Slocum's column encountered no opposition in the tedious and circuitous march to Kelly's, or in effecting the passage of two difficult streams. The Southern historians have either omitted remark on this subject or have implied that General Lee received opportune intelligence of what was passing on his left. Neither the records nor events themselves justify this view of the case. General Stuart, usually so vigilant, seems on this occasion to have been surprised. General Hooker says that four hours after his three corps had crossed the Rappahannock the Southern cavalry were still picketing Richards' ford, and the writer knows that when, thirty-six hours after the passage, General Meade came within sight of Chancellorsville, General Stuart had not yet interposed any body of horse between his advance and Fredericksburg. Nor is it possible that General Lee received timely information of the Federal operations. It is incredible that he would, by choice, have allowed Hooker to concentrate at Chancellorsville with the option, when there, of taking his line in reverse, or of moving upon his line of communications and forcing a battle upon unequal terms. Two brigades (Mahone's and Posey's) of Lee's army were stationed at United States ford, and their commander only received notice of the approaching danger when General Meade was crossing at Ely's ford, only six miles distant, and then from a straggling cavalryman. General Mahone moved at once to Chancellorsville, and it was well he did, for at daybreak the following morning the Federals moved upon his outposts.

A gallant officer and gentleman, like Colonel Cameron, would not wittingly, I know, cast any unjust reproach upon the memory of that Christian patriot, the bravery of whose deeds—from his first charge at Manassas to that crowning act of heroism at Yellow Tavern, where he interposed less than three thousand men between Sheridan's splendidly appointed corps of 12,000 cavalry and the capital of the Confederacy, and gave his own glorious life to the city's defence—will all, some day, adorn the brightest pages of Virginia's history, and, for generations, cause the name of Stuart to be cherished by those who love the noble and the true in human

nature. He sleeps quietly in Hollywood. No monumental shaft or statue of bronze calls the attention of those who frequent our public squares to Virginia's loss when Stuart fell. But his men—those who, on the long, weary march, or in thickest conflict, gladly followed where he led the way; those who, sleeping without shelter, often in rain, ice and snow, rose at his bugle blast, and, though chilled with cold and pinched by hunger, rushed headlong upon the half awakened and confounded divisions of Federal infantry—knew and loved him. His fame is safe in their keeping. He has been blamed for Gettysburg, and yet, with the approval of the Commanding-General, he had gone on an expedition almost unparalleled for the endurance of himself and his command. They crossed the Potomac, marched nearly three days and nights without stopping, except for an hour or so to feed. They destroyed wagon trains of valuable army stores. Nearly a thousand horses and mules and about two hundred wagons were taken. He scattered several considerable bodies of the enemy's troops, and but for erroneous information, which brought him nearly in collision with a superior force, when his men and horses were nearly worn out for want of rest, compelling him to make a considerable detour, he would have reached our army before the battle on the day preceding the great struggle at Gettysburg.

Our cavalry was always made the scapegoat for the disasters that occurred, yet the official statements will show that they rendered most signal service to the army and the country; and that from the constant wear and tear of being always in the saddle, and, the greater part of the time, skirmishing or engaged in more serious conflicts, their losses aggregated fully as much as the other arms of the service.

But returning to the immediate subject of this article, the reader must bear in mind that General Stuart, at Culpeper Courthouse, was picketing the Rappahannock river, from its confluence with the Rapidan up to near its source in the mountains; that his two small brigades of cavalry, and his horse artillery, were expected to guard the entire line from the Blue Ridge to Chancellorsville. Company "G," Third regiment, to which I then belonged, had on its rolls between seventy-five and eighty men, yet on the 17th March, 1863, but thirty men could be turned out fit for duty, and with that force the company went into action at Kelly's ford. The regiment had two hundred and forty officers and men in line that day, lost three killed and nearly forty wounded, and lost

heavily in horses. In the summer of 1865, I wrote out a sort of journal of our cavalry movements. I find I there state that the pickets at Kelly's ford were captured on the 29th April, 1863, but the reserve being stationed further back, made their escape, though their communication with Richards' ford was cut off, so they could not give the alarm to that post according to instructions in such cases. The weather was cloudy and misty, and the surprising force got across the stream, above or below the ford, and under cover of the darkness of early dawn attacked the pickets in rear. Stuart, upon being advised of a force crossing at Kelly's ford, naturally looked for an advance upon Culpeper, and made his dispositions accordingly.

It must be borne in mind that those important arteries of supply—the Chesapeake and Ohio railroad and the James River and Kanawha canal—were frequently the objective points which were aimed at by heavy columns of Federal troops during the war. That a large cavalry column, or even a mixed column of cavalry and infantry, crossing at Kelly's ford, would aim at Gordonsville, Columbia, or some point nearer Richmond (on the Chesapeake and Ohio railroad), was, therefore, more probable than that they constituted a part of a column of attack on General Lee's position at Fredericksburg. Even though they moved out from Kelly's ford on the Germanna road, they might afterwards move to the right and cross the Rapidan at Raccoon or Morton's ford. Accordingly, we find that General Stuart moved forward from his camps and formed his line of battle between Kelly's ford and Culpeper Courthouse. Expecting an attack by a largely superior force, it behooved him to be cautious and to act on the defensive. He awaited the enemy's advance. Their skirmishers and ours were engaged. So situated, our commander could not assume that they were *not going* to attack his position, until after such lapse of time as repelled such an idea. So, shortly after noon, he becoming convinced, from the long delay to advance, that they did *not* mean to advance upon Culpeper, withdrew the greater part of his forces from the Culpeper front, and moved around to the right, so as to interpose his troops between the upper fords of the Rapidan and the enemy. In the presence of such superior numbers, his command could not accomplish much more than to act as a corps of observation. He, however, shelled the enemy's trains, retarded their march, and took some prisoners. It was nearly night before the enemy's movement became fully enough developed to make it

certain that his columns were to cross at Germanna and Ely's fords. The intelligence, with as much of detail as was practicable, was telegraphed General Lee from Culpeper Courthouse. There was one regiment of cavalry, the Tenth Virginia, Colonel J. Lucius Davis, serving on detached duty with General Lee at Fredericksburg, and picketing the fords at Germana, Ely's, &c. At nightfall of the 29th April, Colonel Thomas F. Owen, of the Third Virginia cavalry, was ordered to proceed, with two squadrons of his regiment (leaving the others under command of Lieutenant-Colonel William R. Carter), towards Fredericksburg, crossing at Raccoon ford, and, if possible, getting in front of the Federal column at Germanna ford. Colonel Owen was a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, a fine swordsman, and as bold and dauntless as any officer in the army. The night was dark and rainy, the men could hardly see their file leaders, and our progress was slow. At midnight we reached Locust Grove, and dispatched two strong scouting parties, one towards Germanna and one towards Ely's ford, with instructions to get as close to the enemy as possible, ascertain his strength and position, then to follow on the line of our march and report. We then moved on until reaching a point on the Plank road, nearly opposite, and only a few miles from Germanna ford. Here we halted, dismounted in the woods, and reclining against trees or in fence corners, slept in a drenching rain for nearly two hours. Neither we nor our horses had eaten anything since the morning before. At 3 A. M. a dispatch from General Fitz. Lee directed us to move forward, get in front of and *delay the enemy*, and give all attainable information to General R. E. Lee. We struck the Germanna road near Wilderness tavern, turned up towards Germanna ford, and sent forward another scouting party of five men. Between 6 and 7 A. M., our scouts from Germanna ford reported a heavy column of fifteen to twenty thousand infantry across, with a considerable advance guard of cavalry, which was mounted, and forming to move forward. Shortly after the head of their column came in sight, and our Colonel ordered his first squadron to charge them, he supporting with the others. This they did in gallant style, driving the enemy out of sight. In about half an hour the enemy advanced again in heavier force upon them, and they fell back slowly towards their support. Skirmishers were then thrown out on both sides, and a sharp fusilade kept up for some time. Our scouts from Ely's ford coming in about 8 o'clock, I. was ordered to select a well mounted

trooper, and send a dispatch to General Fitzhugh Lee of what we had learned as to the force at Germanna ford, and also that a heavy wagon train and artillery train were across at Ely's, and, under escort of a large force of infantry, moving towards Chancellorsville. We had sent couriers towards Chancellorsville, to communicate with any of General R. E. Lee's troops found there. I handed the dispatch to Sergeant Bacon, Company A. The fork of the road was now between our force and the enemy, we having slowly retired before his advance. The first squadron again advanced to the charge, and opened the road. Away galloped our courier up the Plank road, and was soon out of sight. But alas! for him—a squad of Yankees dashed across the angle between the two roads, under cover of woods, and captured him before he had gone a mile. He was smart enough to swallow the dispatch and keep mum. Couriers returning from Chancellorsville reported they had been unable to communicate with our troops, who were falling back; and the Federal troops were already at Chancellorsville and sending out scouting detachments. It was now nearly 9 o'clock A. M. We wheeled about and moved on towards Chancellorsville. But finding a strong force in our front, we turned to the right towards Todd's tavern. My Colonel much regretted the unavoidable delay in getting information from his scouting parties—caused, in part, by the severity of the weather, and in part by the difficulties of the work they had to perform in trying to get near the main body of the advancing army. He was informed that a considerable cavalry force was moving across his route and going towards Spotsylvania Courthouse. Nevertheless, deeming the details of information he had gotten important, although he knew that General Lee had been warned by telegraph of the advance, he ordered me, as his column moved along, to send a dispatch to General R. E. Lee. It was still raining, but very slightly. I selected a faithful courier, William A. Bruce, wrote the dispatch on the side of the road, my knee serving for a writing desk, on a scant slip of paper, all I had left, as we left our camp expecting to go at once into action. I gave Colonel Taylor, A. A. G., all the information we had of the two columns moving from Germanna and Ely's ford. And this dispatch was delivered at General R. E. Lee's headquarters between 12 and 1 o'clock that day. Courier Bruce said it was the first intelligence received that morning at army headquarters from the direction of Chancellorsville. Orders were immediately issued for General Jackson's corps to move towards

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Chancellorsville. After feeding our horses at Todd's tavern, we reported to General Wright, of Anderson's division, at Tabernacle church, eight or nine miles west from Fredericksburg. He moved forward that evening, and finding nothing but cavalry in his front, was disposed to regard the whole movement as a feint and a "big scare." We bivouacked for the night on the road side, in rear of General Wright's lines.

I will conclude this article with an incident connected with General Jackson. I was required to detail a lieutenant and detachment of men to report to him on the morning of May 1st. Putting Lieutenant Charles R. Palmore in command, and sending them forward, I walked up the road to get a look at General Jackson. Meeting with my college-mate, Major Alexander Pendleton, of the General's staff, he told me that both General Anderson and General Wright had expressed the opinion, notwithstanding the information we had brought, that this was nothing but a "reconnaissance in force," and he thought General Jackson inclined to the same opinion. The General was standing a little to the right of the road, without side arms, in a gray frock coat, with a short skirt, gray pants, glazed cap, pulled down over his eyes, and with paper and pencil in hand, tracing directions to Lieutenant Palmore (who stood on his right) for the movements of his detachment. Palmore's bridle-reins were hanging on his arm, and his horse standing close up. Receiving his instructions, he turned, mounted, and without looking, pulled his horse to the left. The horse's head came in contact with General Jackson's right shoulder, causing him to "right face" very suddenly. Never taking his eyes from the paper, the General continued his reflections, without being in the least disturbed.

"All Quiet Along the Potomac To-night"—Proof that it was Written by Thaddeus Oliver, of Twiggs County, Georgia.

We have received from Rev. Hugh F. Oliver, of Augusta, Georgia, a lengthy communication in proof of the claim that the poetic gem, "All Quiet Along the Potomac To-night," was written by his father (Thaddeus Oliver), and we regret that our space will not allow us to publish the paper in full.

Mr. Oliver, after introducing two very sweet poems of his father to show that he was *capable* of writing this one, proceeds with the following proofs:

1. He gives incidents in early betrothal of his father to "Mary"—in his wedded life—and in the circumstances under which he left home for the army, to show that he had enacted the poem in his heart's experience long before it was actually written.

2. He gives copious extracts from his father's letters to his mother, to show that long before the poem was written *he had put the same sentiments into prose*—that he claimed the authorship of the poem before it was ever in print—and that after it was printed he again and again reiterated his claim to its authorship.

3. Mr. Oliver then gives, as settling the question, the following letters:

Letter from Frank Daves.

MARTZ, INDIANA, May 30, 1872.

MR. HUGH F. OLIVER, *Madison, Ga.*:

Dear Sir—In reading your article claiming "All Quiet Along the Potomac," for your father, Thaddeus Oliver, I notice that you request all persons who can throw any light on the subject to do so at once; therefore I make the following statements. I do not profess to have any acquaintance with the facts myself, but I have a friend, A. Shaw by name, for whose word I have the greatest respect, who has put me in possession of a train of facts which convinces me that Thaddeus Oliver is the author of the poem.

Mr. Shaw was a member of a Texas regiment, and was in camp with the Second Georgia at the time of the writing of the poem. A few days after the poem was written, he was on a visit to Mr. Oliver, and the latter, while turning over some of his clothing, drew a piece of paper from the pocket of a coat and presented it to Mr. Shaw. This paper was the original manuscript of "All Quiet Along the Potomac." Mr. Shaw, who is the possessor of a brilliant memory, read the poem over a few times, and afterwards rewrote it from memory, making but two or three mistakes in

copying. He says he longed to publish the poem, but would not do so without the consent of the author, which, from the author's modesty, he knew he could never get. He showed me the copy he had made immediately after reading the original.

I do not know of the whereabouts of Mr. Shaw at present, or I would put you on his track. I suppose him to be in this State or Texas. Should you consider this letter of any value in establishing your father's claims to the authorship of the poem under consideration, you are at liberty to use it in any manner you may see fit. Let me congratulate you, Mr. Oliver, on being the son of the genius who created "All Quiet Along the Potomac." I sincerely hope that you may succeed in establishing your father's claims to one of the most powerful lyrics of the late war. Trusting that my mite to the good cause will do all the good it is intended to do,

I am truly, yours,

FRANK DAVES.

Letters of John D. Ashton.

WAYNESBORO', GA., January 2, 1874.

REV. H. F. OLIVER, *Madison, Ga.:*

My Dear Sir—Numerous engagements, of both a private and professional character, and a desire to overlook some old papers of mine, among which I thought it possible I might find a copy of "All Quiet Along the Potomac To-nigh," presented me, after earnest and repeated solicitations, by your father in *his own* handwriting, are my reasons for not having addressed you this letter long before now.

I knew Thaddeus Oliver well, perhaps more intimately than any member of the Second Georgia regiment, outside his own company. We first met in the convention, of which we both were members, that convened in Milledgeville, in 1860, to send delegates to the the National Democratic convention, then soon to assemble in Charleston.

On the 9th of April, 1861, the "Burke sharpshooters," in which I was a private, was ordered to Tybee island. About the same time the "Buena Vista guards," of which your lamented father was a member, with other companies, was sent to a point below Savannah, for the purpose of organizing the Second Georgia regiment, afterwards so ably commanded by that noble patriot and brave, heroic soldier, Paul J. Semmes.

At the organization, Captain Butt, of your father's company, than whom a more high-toned, generous gentleman or gallant officer was not in the Army of Northern Virginia, defeated Captain Holmes, of mine, for the majority; and believing that unfair means had been employed to produce the result, in which I was entirely mistaken, I wrote and published a bitter article, which I afterwards often had cause to regret, in which I animadverted,

with cruel and unprovoked severity, upon Major Butt. This produced an estrangement between your father and myself, which continued unhealed until a common service and a common danger brought us once more together.

Our regiment was soon ordered to Virginia—first to Richmond, thence to Acquia creek, and afterwards to Centreville, from whence detachments were weekly sent out on distant pickets, almost within bow-shot of the Potomac, along whose lines the bones of many a gallant Southron rest. On one of these posts your father and I again were reconciled; and belonging to the same profession, with many tastes and sympathies in common, I soon became warmly and strongly attached to him, and have many reasons to know that the feeling was, in part, at least, reciprocated. I state these facts for the purpose of showing you how I happen to know what I do about the authorship of the lines in question; for your father, besides being a modest man, was never quick to give either his hand or confidence to a stranger.

We had just returned from Falls' church, near Alexandria, to Centreville. None of Longstreet's old brigade, none of the Second Georgia, I know, will ever forget the dark, cold, rainy night march on the retreat from there to Fairfax Courthouse. But though we all were drenched and shivering, there still was "life in the old land yet." I remember well, as we rested on our arms in the murky gloom, some one cried out, "Whose treat is this?" when Judge Perry, now of this county, then orderly sergeant of company "D," in the Second Georgia, utterly unable, even there, to resist his abominable *penchant* for punning, answered, "It is Long's-treat." But I am digressing.

We had now returned to Centreville, and one evening while in conversation with your father on law and literary subjects, as uncongenial as these may seem, I proposed to read him some lines I had written and published, "To Wilson's New York Zouaves." After I had finished, he appeared to be absorbed for a moment, then said: "Well, I have just written some lines myself, which I shall not publish, but if you will promise me secrecy, I will read them to you." I promised, and for the first time in my life, heard "All Quiet along the Potomac To-night." I shall never forget either the occasion or the circumstances. He read the lines without unusual feeling until he came to the picture of the little trundle-bed, when his voice trembled and his eyes filled with tears. That "touch of nature" was contagious, and I felt the big drops trickling down my own cheeks; and even to this day, when I recall the scene, now that he is dead and gone, I feel again something of the old emotion.

I begged him at once for a copy, but he resolutely refused. Shortly after, however, I left Virginia for Georgia and took command of a company in a regiment there being organized for the Confederate service. The day before my departure I prevailed on him to comply with my request, "upon my honor as soldier" that

I would neither read it in the regiment, have it published, nor mention his name in connection with its authorship. This promise, I am sorry to say, I only partially fulfilled; for I read the poem to Dr. Charles Bostick, now of this county: John H. Hudson, late of Jefferson county, but now deceased, and to my brother, Dr. Wm. W. Ashton, now of Shreveport, Louisiana, who were my mess-mates before leaving the regiment, and, on my return to Georgia, to my wife, and told her who wrote it. That your father was the author of the poem, there can never be, to my mind at least, even the shadow of a doubt. * * * *

Though professional critics may perhaps smile, or ridicule the idea, I submit that the poem itself furnishes almost positive internal evidence of having been written by a married man upon whom the sacred memories of home, and wife, and children were crowding as he wrote. Such a man was Mr. Oliver. * * * * Mr. Oliver, both by natural gifts and careful culture, was fully equal to such a production. * * * * From Mr. Oliver's well-known modesty, he would have been the very last man to publish the poem, if he published it at all over his own signature. * *

I have no desire whatever for any publicity in this controversy, indeed I would gladly avoid it, but I feel it due to justice and the memory of your gallant and gifted father to place this communication at your disposal. Though I neither know you personally, nor have had any correspondence with you, I beg you to accept the assurance of my high esteem with sentiments of sincere regard.

JOHN DEVEREUX ASHTON.

HALEYONDALE, GEORGIA, July 20, 1874.

Rev. HUGH F. OLIVER:

My Dear Sir—I owe you many apologies for my long silence, but have delayed answering your further inquiries touching the authorship of "All Quiet Along the Potomac To-night," that I might overlook a large number of letters written by me to my wife from Virginia during the summer and fall of 1861, thinking that some of them might enable me to fix, or approximate dates that had escaped my memory when I last wrote you. And I am gratified beyond measure to inform you that the search has not been in vain.

You will remember that in my communication to you, published in the *Savannah Morning News*, I stated that, after acquainting my brother and Dr. Bostick with the noble lyric in question while still in camp, I subsequently read it to Mrs. Ashton. I find now that I wrote to her on the subject before returning to Georgia. I have before me a letter addressed to her, written on coarse yellow Confederate paper, dated "Camp Second Georgia regiment, near Centreville, Virginia, October 3d, 1861," in which the following sentence occurs: "Upon my arrival at home, should I be so fortunate as to obtain the hoped-for furlough, I will read you the touching and

beautiful poem mentioned in my letter of last week—"All Quiet Along the Potomac"—written by my *girlishly modest* friend, Thaddeus Oliver, of the 'Buena Vista guards.' I should like for you to know him; for, though almost as diffident and retiring as a gentle girl, he is a man of culture, fine literary tastes, and an excellent lawyer."

From this letter, therefore, I am enabled to say, with positiveness and certainty, that these now celebrated lines were familiar to me at least a month or six weeks before they appeared in *Harper's [Weekly]*.

There is another circumstance, too, connected with the earlier publications of this poem, to which I wish to call your attention. I am unable now to recall the precise time when I first saw it in print, but this I remember with perfect distinctness: that it was introduced as a *waif*, or as *having been found in the pocket of an unknown dead soldier*. You may have seen such a preface to it yourself. At any rate, I am sure there must be many still living who will recall the fact.

Whatever the world may hereafter think of the authorship of these beautiful lines, I, at least, shall live and die under the firm and unalterable conviction that they were conceived and first expressed by your gifted and lamented father.

Yours, truly,

JOHN D. ASHTON.

Communication to Richmond (Virginia) Dispatch.

RICHMOND, May 4, 1872.

Editors of the Dispatch:

In connection with the recently revived question as to the authorship of "All Quiet Along the Potomac," which is now being generally discussed in the Southern journals, I beg to narrate the following, which, with some, may have a bearing upon the pretensions of some of the claimants. In the summer of 1862, being in the company of several Mississippi soldiers, comrades of * * * the beauty of the lines, which were then becoming generally known, was commented upon, and the question of authorship discussed. They spoke very lightly of both the valor and literary ability of * * * asserting positively that he did not write the lines; that, though he promulgated them in his regiment, they were, by his comrades, supposed to have been written by a private soldier in a Georgia regiment.

R. A. B.

On the whole, the proofs which we file for the inspection of any who may be interested in reading them in full, seem conclusive that this beautiful poem was written by Mr. THADDEUS OLIVER, of the Second Georgia regiment, who was a gallant soldier, and gave his life for "the land he loved." Happy the son who had such a

father! Fortunate the father who left a son whose facile pen can vindicate his claim to the authorship of such a poem.

"All quiet along the Potomac to-night,"
 Except now and then a stray picket
 Is shot, as he walks on his beat to and fro,
 By a rifleman hid in the thicket.
 'Tis nothing—a private or two now and then
 Will not count in the news of the battle;
 Not an officer lost—only one of the men—
 Moaning out, all alone, the death-rattle.

"All quiet along the Potomac to-night,"
 Where the soldiers lie peacefully dreaming;
 Their tents, in the rays of the clear autumn moon,
 Or the light of the watch-fires, are gleaming.
 A tremulous sigh, as the gentle night-wind
 Through the forest leaves slowly is creeping,
 While the stars up above, with their glittering eyes,
 Keep guard—for the army is sleeping.

There is only the sound of the lone sentry's tread,
 As he tramps from the rock to the fountain,
 And thinks of the two on the low trundle-bed,
 Far away in the cot on the mountain.
 His musket falls slack—his face, dark and grim,
 Grows gentle with memories tender,
 As he mutters a prayer for his children asleep—
 For their mother, may Heaven defend her!

The moon seems to shine as brightly as then,
 That night, when the love yet unspoken
 Leaped up to his lips, and when low-murmured vows
 Were pledged to be ever unbroken.
 Then drawing his sleeve roughly over his eyes,
 He dashes off tears that are welling,
 And gathers his gun close up to its place,
 As if to keep down the heart-swelling.

He passes the fountain, the blasted pine-tree,
 The footstep is lagging and weary,
 Yet onward he goes, through the broad belt of light,
 Towards the shades of the forest so dreary.
 Hark! was it the night-wind that rustled the leaves?
 Was it moonlight so wondrously flashing?
 It looked like a rifle—ah! Mary, good-bye!
 And the life-blood is ebbing and splashing!

"All quiet along the Potomac to-night,"
 No sound save the rush of the river;
 While soft falls the dew on the face of the dead—
 The picket's off duty forever!

McClellan and Lee at Sharpsburg (Antietam).—A Review of Mr. Curtis' Article in the North American Review.

By General D. H. MAURY.

[The following article was sent by General Maury to the *North American Review*, but was respectfully declined. The editor seems to act on the principle that historic accuracy is a matter of small importance where only "Rebels" are concerned, and that he is under no obligation to correct mis-statements made concerning *them*. We cheerfully give place to the article, in the hope that some of our friends on the other side will now see its force, and that future generations will be more ready to do us justice.]

The April number of the *North American Review* contains an interesting article on McClellan's last great service to his country, in which I heartily concur, so far as the writer's high estimate of the capacity, conduct and character of General McClellan goes. A long and intimate association with him enables me to appreciate his remarkable professional accomplishments, and to respect and admire the excellence and purity of his personal character. No good man can see much of him without feeling affection for him and absolute confidence in him.

Of all the commanders of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan alone inspired his troops with enthusiastic love for him; and this was never so manifested as in the campaign so ably discussed by Mr. Curtis—a campaign in which McClellan evinced the very highest capacities of a general—by which he saved the Federal cause—and on the achievement of which he was deposed from the command of his great and devoted army, and retired forever from the service of the government he had saved.

I cordially concur in the conviction generally held by the Southern people, that his removal at that time greatly protracted the war. It is difficult to explain the capricious policy of the men then at the head of the Government.

But it is evident there was little in common between them and McClellan. He was born and bred amongst people of the highest culture and refinement, and the personal traits of his immediate superiors were offensive to him, while the frequent interference with his plans, which their crude and timid counsels forced upon him, must have filled him with chagrin and disgust.

Mr. Curtis shows the moving causes of his extraordinary deposition. They lay in the best traits of his character. He was too

able and too honest to be the facile tool of any man or government. He was so high and noble a gentleman that those who ruled this country then could not appreciate him. Unable to understand him or to control him to do that which his convictions forbade, they mistrusted and feared and hated and deposed him.

The clearness with which McClellan divined Lee's movements after the defeat of Pope—the celerity and masterly skill with which he restored discipline and confidence to Pope's routed army, and so moved its corps as to concentrate upon Lee while near half his army was a days' march from the field of battle—must ever rank him high as a general.

It is true he did enjoy the rare privilege of having before him Lee's orders for the movements of *his* army, which were so explicit that McClellan was enabled to direct the movements of his own with absolute confidence and accuracy.

In summing up the results of the battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg, Mr. Curtis has had but little regard to historic accuracy, and it is surprising that a writer so intelligent and industrious as he should not have availed himself of the abundant authentic documents accessible to all historians of these times.

The official statements of the Confederate and Federal Governments, and of General Lee and General McClellan, all contradict every paragraph of Mr. Curtis' summary, which is to this effect:

1st. "On the 17th, the battle of Antietam ended in the defeat of the Confederates."

2d. "On the night of the 18th, the Confederate army recrossed the Potomac into Virginia, leaving 2,700 of their dead unburied on the field."

3d. "Thirteen guns (13), thirty-nine (39) colors, fifteen thousand stands of small arms, and more than 6,000 prisoners, were captured by the Federals in the battles of South mountain, Crampton's gap and Antietam—without losing a gun or a color!"

4th. "The aggregate of the Federal killed, wounded and missing in the battle of Antietam was 12,469."

5th. "The total number of the Federal forces was 87,164."

6th. The enemy had about 10,000 more."

A careful investigation of each of the above paragraphs will convict it of error:

1st. How could the battle have ended in the defeat of the Confederates, when Lee's army still held the ground for which it had fought? The field of battle from which McClellan tells us 87,164 men of his army had been driven in a condition so disordered and

demoralized that he did not dare to venture them again in action, though all day, up to the 19th, Lee held the field and dared him to try to take it.

2d. Lee crossed the Potomac on the *morning* of the 19th—not as Mr. Curtis puts it, “the night of the 18th.” So great a number of unburied dead as 2,700 is inconsistent with the facts that during the 17th and 18th the Confederate army buried many of its dead, which, added to 2,700, would have swelled our casualties to such a number as would have included nearly all of the men in Lee’s army. Northern accounts at the time put the unburied dead at 2,000. The most authentic estimates of all of Lee’s casualties on the field of Sharpsburg will not exceed 8,000.

Paragraph number 3 is utterly refuted by such authority as Mr. Curtis cannot refuse to accept.

Mr. Greeley, of the *Tribune*, thus growls over the conclusion of those *defeats* of Lee: “He leaves us the debris of his late camps, two disabled pieces of artillery, a few hundred of his stragglers, perhaps 2,000 of his wounded, and as many of his unburied dead—not a sound field piece, caisson, ambulance or wagon, not a tent, box of stores or pound of ammunition. He takes with him the supplies gathered in Maryland, and the rich spoils of Harper’s Ferry!”

To this testimony we will add General Lee’s own congratulatory order, which tells the whole story grandly, and stands for all time unquestioned and unquestionable:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
October 2d, 1862.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 116.

In reviewing the achievements of the army during the present campaign, the Commanding-General cannot withhold the expression of his admiration of the indomitable courage it has displayed in battle and its cheerful endurance of privation and hardship on the march.

Since your great victories around Richmond, you have defeated the enemy at Cedar mountain, expelled him from the Rappahannock, and after a conflict of three days utterly repulsed him on the plains of Manassas and forced him to take shelter within the fortification around his capital.

Without halting for repose you crossed the Potomac, stormed the heights of Harper’s Ferry, made prisoners of more than 11,000 men, and captured upwards of seventy pieces of artillery, all their small arms and other munitions of war.

While one corps of the army was thus engaged, the other insured its success by arresting at Boonsboro' the combined armies of the enemy advancing under their favorite General to the relief of their beleaguered comrades.

On the field of Sharpsburg, with less than one-third his numbers, you resisted from daylight until dark the whole army of the enemy, and repulsed every attack along his entire front of more than four miles in extent.

The whole of the following day you stood prepared to resume the conflict on the same ground, and retired next morning without molestation across the Potomac.

Two attempts subsequently made by the enemy to follow you across the river have resulted in his complete discomfiture and being driven back with loss.

Achievements such as these demanded much valor and patriotism. History records few examples of greater fortitude and endurance than this army has exhibited; and I am commissioned by the President to thank you in the name of the Confederate States for the undying fame you have won for their arms. Much as you have done, much more remains to be accomplished. The enemy again threatens us with invasion, and to your tried valor and patriotism the country looks with confidence for deliverance and safety.

Your past exploits give assurance that this confidence is not misplaced.

R. E. LEE, *General-Commanding.*

Paragraph 4 is correct as far as it goes; but General McClellan tells us he lost in killed, wounded and missing in the battles of South mountain, Crampton's gap and Antietam near 15,000 men.

Paragraph 5 mistakes the total number of troops engaged by McClellan for the total strength of his army present with him.

McClellan states that he had 87,164 men *actually in battle* at Antietam—and we know he had one corps which did not fire a shot.

Paragraph 6 is very wide of the mark indeed, and we will sum up from the best evidence attainable the whole forces of Lee's army engaged on the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th of September, 1862, and we challenge Mr. Curtis to disprove the accuracy of this statement:

On the 14th, D. H. Hill, with less than 10,000 men, held McClellan's army in check all day.

On the 15th, Stonewall Jackson, with 9,793 Confederates, captured over 11,000 Federals, more than 70 cannon, several thousand horses, and all of their small arms, colors and equipments!

On the 15th, Lee took position at Sharpsburg, with 17,460 in-

fantry and several thousand cavalry and artillery, while McClellan's army confronted him on the line of the Antietam.

On the 16th, about 3 P. M., McClellan assaulted Lee with the three corps of Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner, which were so severely punished, that McClellan tells us that "about the middle of the afternoon, he went in person to the scene and found the aspect of affairs anything but promising"; in fact, they were driven from the field by Lee in utter confusion.

On the 17th, the attack was renewed by McClellan with a fresh corps. During the day Stonewall Jackson came to Lee—his force was 9,793 infantry, which brought Lee's whole army up to 27,253 infantry, and less than 8,000 cavalry and artillery—and this was all he had to fight with during all those days of Antietam, or *Sharpsburg*, as we call it. And with these, we learn from McClellan himself, Lee drove from the field, demoralized, 87,164 men—four-fifths of McClellan's whole army!

We will now sum up McClellan's losses during the five days, from the 14th to the 19th, inclusive:

McClellan reports his losses, from the 14th to the 17th,	-	14,469
15th, Jackson captured,	- - - - -	11,000
19th, A. P. Hill reports a rear-guard affair on the Potomac,		
in which the enemy lost,	- - - - -	3,000

Making the total Federal loss,	- - - - -	28,469
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Or 1,000 more than all the infantry with which Lee fought Antietam!

It is injudicious at this late day to reiterate such crude statements of numbers as those I have been discussing. The Southern Historical Society, at Richmond, and the Archive Bureau, in Washington, have co-operated to secure for the use of those who write history all of the authentic documents in existence which bear upon the late conflict between the States. From these all questions of relative forces and losses can be accurately settled, and it is not wise to omit to consult them before making historical publications.

There has been so much disposition during the war, and since, to overestimate the strength of the Confederate armies, that I again call attention to the official statements of the United States War Department relating thereto. They are very conclusive. When we remember that the white population of the Confederate States was only about 5,000,000, and of the United States 16,000,000, the War Department reports show the men enrolled in Federal

armies, 2,600,000; men enrolled in Confederate armies, 600,000; white men from South in Federal armies (principally from Missouri, Kentucky and West Virginia), 400,000; in 1863, when our armies were greatest, their strength did not much exceed 200,000; Federal prisoners held by us, 270,000; Confederate prisoners lost by us, 220,000; Federal prisoners who died in our prisons, 22,576; Confederate prisoners who died in Northern prisons, 26,436. These figures are of unquestionable authority, and should always be regarded conclusive in considering questions which arise about relative forces, treatment of prisoners, &c.

After the generation of non-combatants, who harked us on to war against each other, while they traded in our blood, shall have passed away, these figures, with all they prove, will fix in history the conduct of the armies of the Southern Confederacy, and the character of the Southern people.

DABNEY H. MAURY.

Operations about Lookout Mountain.

We have on hand, and now publish for the first time, a number of reports of affairs about Lookout mountain. The reports given below will be followed by others until the whole of the series we have is completed.

We have been promised by several officers of high standing papers which shall discuss certain important features of these operations. Meantime these reports, never before in print, will be regarded as valuable contributions to the history of the Army of Tennessee:

Report of General Longstreet.

OCTOBER 29, 1863.

Colonel GEORGE WILLIAM BRENT, *Assistant-Adjutant General*:

Colonel—Up to the 9th of October my forces were along the regular line of investment, extending from Lookout mountain, on the left, to Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill's corps, on the right. My left occupied the base of the mountain, and sharpshooters extended the line to the river on the west slope of the mountain. I had a small picket upon the summit of the mountain, and a small cavalry force about Trenton reported to me from time to time. On the 9th, I received orders to send my sharpshooters down the river to occupy a point on the left bank between Raccoon mountain and

Walden's ridge, for the purpose of preventing the use of the road on the opposite bank by the enemy's wagon trains. As I had but a small force of sharpshooters, I thought it best to send a brigade in addition, as a smaller force would be liable to be cut off and captured. A brigade was thought to be force enough to secure its retreat to the mountains, and finally to make its escape to our main force should a movement be made against it. General Law's brigade was selected for the service, and a sufficient force was ordered to the point indicated as soon as practicable. Pits were sunk and occupied by the troops, and they effectually put a stop to the travel on the road on the opposite bank. We were advised in a few days, however, that the enemy was using another road, a little longer, which avoided this point, and he had several other roads of communication that were entirely beyond our reach, particularly the Poe and Anderson roads. On the 25th, I was ordered to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Bridgeport. This reconnoissance was interrupted by the enemy's making a crossing of the river at Brown's ferry, about three miles below the point of Lookout mountain.

As soon as the crossing was discovered, the troops near the point assembled and drove back the enemy's advance, but the force was found to be crossing in too much strength to be successfully opposed by a brigade. The brigade was therefore concentrated and withdrawn to the foot of the mountain on the west side. The force near the crossing was small, as the duty for which the brigade was ordered was to guard a point some six miles below Brown's ferry. The brigade could not be reinforced, as the enemy's moccasin batteries commanded the only road across the mountain. If it had been practicable to reinforce, I should not have thought myself authorized to do so by taking my troops that were occupying their proper positions in the line of investment for that purpose, as my orders and the disposition of my troops had no reference to any such move on the part of the enemy, and to have done so would have broken our line and exposed the whole army. Besides the enemy's position was such that he could reinforce from any point of his lines in half an hour, whilst I could only reinforce from my nearest point in about three hours. He would have the benefit of his artillery, and we could not cross the mountain with ours. On the 27th, I received orders to make arrangements and examinations for the purpose of dislodging the enemy from his new position, and with that view was called to meet the Commanding-General on the mountain on the following day. On the afternoon of the 27th, I received a report from my signal party, near Trenton, that the enemy was advancing in force from Bridgeport. I sent this information up to the Commanding-General, but as it was not confirmed by the cavalry, it was not credited.

On the 28th I met the Commanding-General on the mountain in accordance with his appointment. Whilst engaged in an examination of the enemy's new position, one of my signal party re-

ported to us that the enemy was advancing in force from Bridgeport. He guided us to a projection on the mountain, about a mile off, where we saw the head of the enemy's column, and where we saw his force, about five thousand, file past and unite with the force already at Brown's ferry. The rear guard of this command, about fifteen hundred, with a battery of artillery, came up in about an hour and halted about three miles from the main force. The road between the two commands ran along the western base of a series of heights, and parallel to them. The position that had been taken by General Law's brigade was about a mile from this road, and opposite the point of the road about half way between the rear guard and the main force. As soon as the rear guard halted, I sent orders to General Jenkins to concentrate at the base of the mountain his three brigades that were on the east side, and to be ready to cross it as soon as it was dark enough to conceal our men from the fire of the enemy's batteries, and I directed that he should report to me upon the mountain at once. I also ordered General Law to advance his brigade as soon as it was dark, and occupy the height in his immediate front, which commanded the road between the enemy's forces. General Jenkins reported in time to see the positions occupied by the enemy. He was ordered to hold the point designated for General Law, with a sufficient force, whilst a portion of his command moved up the road and captured or dispersed the rear guard. He was also directed, if time and circumstances favored it, to make a demonstration against the main force, and if an attack at night should give us such advantage as to warrant it, to endeavor to drive the enemy across the river, but if the latter should appear inexpedient, to recross the mountain before daylight. As soon as it was dark, his troops were put in motion, but the route across the point of the mountain was so difficult that he was not able to get his troops into their positions until midnight. He arranged two brigades, under General Law, to hold the position between the enemy's forces, whilst his own brigade, under Colonel Bratton, was sent to make the attack upon the rear guard. His fourth brigade, General Benning's, was held on the left of General Law's two, in readiness to reinforce Colonel Bratton. The brigade under Colonel Bratton claims to have had complete success up to the moment that it was recalled. It was recalled in consequence of General Law's abandoning his position, which was essential to the safety of Colonel Bratton's command. As soon as General Law yielded his position, it became necessary to recall Colonel Bratton, and send the troops back to their positions, in order that they might pass the mountain before daylight. The loss sustained by the two brigades under General Law was probably one-tenth of the loss sustained by the single brigade which claims a victory. As General Law's troops were veterans, I can only attribute the want of conduct with his troops to a strong feeling of jealousy among the brigadier-generals. About eight o'clock at night, on the 28th, I received notice that the

Commanding-General had approved my plan, and information from him that another of my divisions had been relieved from the lines and could be used in this attack, but it was too late for it to cross the mountain before daylight, and the success of the affair depended entirely upon a night attack and a surprise. To have put two divisions on the west side of the mountain during daylight would have exposed them to an attack from the enemy's entire force, without artillery, and in a position where they could not be reinforced. My object was merely to inflict such damage upon the enemy as might be accomplished by a surprise. That the point was not essential to the enemy at Chattanooga is established by the fact that he supplied his army at that place some six weeks without it.

About the 31st of October, Lieutenant-General Hardee, Major-General Breckinridge, and myself, were ordered to examine this position with a view to a general battle. It was decided that an attack was impracticable. That the only route by which our troops could reach the field was a difficult mountain road, only practicable for infantry, and entirely exposed to the enemy's batteries on the other side of the river. His positions were connected by a short and easy route, whilst ours would have been separated by a mountain impassable to artillery, except by a detour of some fifty miles, and hardly practicable for infantry.

Our position was so faulty that we could not accomplish that which was hoped for.

We were trying to starve the enemy out by investing him on the only side from which he could not have gathered supplies.

Copies of communications connected with this matter are appended to this report. The reports of the subordinate officers have already been forwarded.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. LONGSTREET, *Lieutenant-General.*

List of Casualties in Jenkins' brigade—Colonel John Bratton commanding—in the action at Lookout Mountain, on the night of the 28th of October, 1863.

COMMAND.	Killed—Officers and Enlisted Men.	Wounded—Officers and Enlisted Men.	Missing—Officers and Enlisted Men.	Total—Officers and Enlisted Men.
Sixth South Carolina regiment.....		13	3	16
Fifth South Carolina regiment	9	84	9	102
Second South Carolina rifles.....	6	51	7	64
First South Carolina regiment.....	2	38	5	45
Palmetto sharpshooters.....	6	35	3	44
Hampton legion.....	8	65	12	85
Grand total.....	31	286	39	356

Original Rough Draft of Report of General C. L. Stevenson.

JANUARY 2, 1863.

General—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the troops of my command, west of Chattanooga creek, on the 24th of November, 1863.

On the 12th of November, I was directed to move my division from the position near the tunnel of the East Tennessee and Georgia railroad, which it had occupied since its return from East Tennessee, to the extreme left of our infantry lines, the top of Lookout mountain, reporting to Lieutenant-General Hardee. On the 11th of November, the positions of the troops of his command were assigned by the Lieutenant-General—Walker's division (commanded by Brigadier-General Gist) to occupy that portion of the line which lay west of Chattanooga creek, to the Chattanooga road, at the base of the mountain; Cheatham's division (commanded by Brigadier-General Jackson), that known as the "Craven House slope," extending from the left of Walker's line to Smith's trail, on the western side of the mountain; and the defence of the top of the mountain was entrusted to my division and a very small and inadequate force of cavalry.

The position assigned to me, the table on the top of the mountain, included the pass at Johnston's crook, distant eighteen (18) miles. The numerous passes along the western crest, to "Nickajack" pass, a distance of about ten (10) miles, were held by infantry; the remainder by a small force of cavalry. The defensive works on the mountain extended across from east to west at about two and a half miles from the point.

To guard this extended line, to protect these numerous passes, and to complete, with the dispatch so frequently urged upon me by the Commanding-General, the line of defence, the work upon which was prosecuted, agreeably to his order, day and night, and the necessity of watching with the utmost vigilance the movements of the heavy force of the enemy threatening my rear at Stephens' gap and Johnston's crook, demanded and received my constant and undivided attention. By personal inspection and reconnoissance, I familiarized myself with the character of the line entrusted to me, but had neither time nor occasion to acquaint myself with the dispositions made by the Lieutenant-General Commanding for the defence of the rest of the line, further than such information as I acquired by personal observation in visiting and adjusting the posts of my pickets and signal stations, at and near the point of the mountain, from which place, in favorable weather, both armies could be plainly discerned.

On the 23d of November, about 1 o'clock P. M., my attention was attracted by heavy firing in the valley below. I immediately proceeded to the point of the mountain, from which I could plainly see all the movements of the enemy. I watched them closely until dark, and then hurried off the following dispatch, by signal, both to Lieutenant-General Hardee and direct to General Bragg:

"I observed closely from the point the movements of the enemy until dark. Their object seemed to be to attract our attention. All the troops in sight were formed from centre to left. Those on their right moved to centre. The troops from 'Raccoon' were in line in full sight. If they intend to attack, my opinion is it will be upon our left. Both of their bridges are gone."

The movements of the enemy and his demonstration against our right, were such that, in my own mind, I had not the slightest doubt that his purpose was to attract our attention, induce us to concentrate on our right, thereby weakening our left, and thus render the acquisition of the "Craven House slope" practicable for him.

His manœuvre had the desired effect, for during that evening Walker's entire division was removed from its position to the extreme right, and the force west of Chattanooga creek thereby diminished more than one-third. After dark, I was informed by Lieutenant-General Hardee, that he had been ordered to the extreme right, and I was directed to assume command of the troops west of Chattanooga creek. To fill, as far as possible, the vacancy caused by the removal of Walker's division, Jackson's brigade, of

Cheatham's division, was removed from the "Craven House slope," and Cumming's brigade, of my own division, from the top of the mountain—General Cumming, as senior officer present, being placed in command of the two brigades. I was advised by Lieutenant-General Hardee to transfer my headquarters to the "Craven house," and subsequently to the camp just vacated by him.

Having thus, without the slightest premonition—not only a large portion of the troops, but even the permanent commands having been removed—been placed in command, at night, at a most critical period, over a wing of the army with whose position and disposition, as I have already stated, I had enjoyed no opportunity of making myself acquainted, I at once used every exertion to gain the necessary information, by sending every officer of my staff, and devoting the whole night myself to riding over and examining the lines. I found the position, at which General Hardee advised me to establish my headquarters, to be on the *eastern* side of Chattanooga creek, some distance beyond the extreme right of my line, and at least two and a half miles from the base of the mountain. The distance, and the fact that the situation was most unfavorable for personal observation, determined me to return to the mountain, which afforded this advantage in the highest degree, and I accordingly addressed you the appended communication (A). On my way back I examined the whole line, and, at sunrise, reached the "Craven house."

After examining the "Craven House slope," I was convinced that, should it be attacked by the enemy, it would be impossible, with the force at my disposal, to hold any point upon the north-west side, so completely was it commanded by the batteries of the enemy on Moccasin point, and those on the ridge near Lookout creek, recently erected to command that slope, and I was satisfied that the best plan that could be adopted in such an event was to hold a line near the "Craven house," placing Walthall on the Northwest slope, with a strong force of skirmishers on the creek to resist the enemy as long as possible, finally falling back fighting to the line selected; posting as many sharpshooters as possible on Lookout point, from which position they could pour upon the enemy a most destructive fire, and by descending Smith's trail with troops from above, to strike him in flank. Accordingly, after seeing General Moore, and conversing with him upon the subject of his line, and his ability to hold it, of which he spoke with some confidence, I went to the top of the mountain to make what I conceived to be the proper disposition of the troops there. I directed Brigadier-General Brown, then commanding my division, to hold the large portion of Pettus' brigade ready to move at a moment's notice to any point to which it should be ordered. I thus provided, as well as the means at my disposal permitted, either for an attack upon Cumming or Jackson.

Immediately upon my arrival on the mountain, I directed the lookouts at the point to keep a close watch, and advise me of any movements that the enemy might make.

About 10 o'clock A. M., I received from Brigadier-General Jackson, the communication (B) written him by General Walthall, and, soon afterwards was informed by the men at the point that there was some picket firing on Lookout creek. I immediately rode to the point to see what was going on. The enemy had, by felling trees, constructed three (3) temporary bridges over the creek, and in a short time forced a passage. The troops, as they crossed, formed to cover the passage of the remainder. I immediately sent a staff officer of General Hardee's, Major W. D. Pickett, who happened to be with me, to General Jackson, to inform him of what I had seen, and to direct him at once to place all of his troops in position. He reached General Jackson, I suppose, a little after eleven (11) o'clock A. M. I caused the picket at Smith's trail to be largely increased, and a strong force to be posted as sharpshooters along the crest of the mountain. The artillery, with trails raised, opened with spirit and effect, and was used until the enemy advanced so close under the cliff that the guns could not be sufficiently depressed for the shots to take effect.

General Walthall's pickets and skirmishers extended from the turnpike bridge of Lookout creek to the railroad bridge, and thence making nearly a right angle across the northwest slope of the mountain to a point near Smith's trail. The enemy, as Walthall mentions in his report, had threatened to force a passage of the creek on his right, but their real movement was upon his left. A large force had moved up the creek, under cover of the fog, crossed above, and passing along the western slope, attacked him successfully in flank and rear. Their advance on the flank and from the front was gallantly contested, but though their front line sometimes wavered, they pressed on, Walthall falling back to the line which I have before mentioned, but with very heavy loss in prisoners, owing to the enemy's taking him in flank and rear. Finding that the fog was becoming so dense that the troops on the northern point of the mountain could not see the enemy moving upon Walthall, I gave orders for Pettus, with my only disposable force, to move down and report to Brigadier-General Jackson. He started at 12½ o'clock, and reached the scene of action a little past one (1) o'clock, relieving Walthall on the left of Moore's line. This position was held by Moore, Walthall and Pettus until about 8 o'clock P. M., when Walthall, and part of Pettus' command, were relieved by Clayton's brigade, commanded by Colonel Holtzclaw, which was sent to cover the movement to the right. Moore and Holtzclaw retired from the position about 2 o'clock A. M., on the 25th.

Early in the day the appended communication (D) was received from General Bragg. A perusal of it will show how highly important he on *that day* considered my making such dispositions as would effectually prevent a severance of the troops which I commanded from the main body of the army.

About the time that the attack was made upon Walthall, the enemy massed a considerable force upon the Chattanooga road, in

front of Cumming's line, evidently for the purpose of co-operating with and making a demonstration in favor of their assaulting column. The number of his troops massed for this purpose, who had been in plain sight until the view was obscured by the mist, the serious weakness of Cumming's force, there not being a man for yards upon some parts of the line, and the certainty that to reinforce the command near the "Craven house" from Cumming was to give the enemy an opportunity to cut us off from the main body, without even a show of resistance, are facts which rendered it highly improper to withdraw a man from that line.

I have already stated that he had but two brigades to hold the lines from Chattanooga creek to the Chattanooga road at the base of the mountain; the force early that morning at the "Craven House slope" had consisted of two brigades, Moore's and Wal-thall's, and was now reinforced by the larger part of a third, Pettus', while, on the mountain top, there were but one very small brigade and two regiments of another, the larger portion being between the front and the works, the other picketing and holding a line of about ten (10) miles.

I had been directed by General Bragg, if I needed reinforcements, to call for them (see letter marked C), and as soon as I saw that the enemy were attacking and would carry the point, I availed myself of the order, and called both upon Generals Breckinridge and Bragg for them by a staff officer. I instructed him to say to them that if they would send me reinforcements, I would, when the fog rose, attack the enemy in flank by sharpshooters on the mountain crest, and descending Smith's trail take him in rear, and, I doubted not, drive him from the slope. This statement I repeated by three other staff officers, sent at intervals of a half hour. After waiting for some time for an answer, I received a verbal order from General Bragg, to the effect that no reinforcements could be sent me—that I must withdraw as best I could, under cover of the mist and night, and that one brigade would be sent to the base of the mountain to cover the withdrawal. Subsequently, I received the following note:

"2½ O'CLOCK P. M.

"The General-Commanding instructs me to say, that you will withdraw your command from the mountain to this side of Chattanooga creek, destroying the bridges behind. Fight the enemy as you retire. The thickness of the fog will enable you to retire, it is hoped, without much difficulty."

After dark, Major-General Breckinridge, then my corps commander, reached the foot of the mountain with one brigade—Clayton's—to be used in covering the withdrawal, by which Wal-thall's and a part of Pettus' command, as has been heretofore stated, were relieved.

I was engaged in issuing the necessary orders for the retirement of the troops, when Major-General Cheatham, a part of whose division was then under my command, arrived. He informed me that he had come to consult with me, but not to take command.

I sent the troops from the top of the mountain down, and then proceeded myself to a point near its base, where General Cheatham and myself had appointed to meet. Here, as senior officer, he assumed command, and I then gave no further directions with regard to the retirement of the troops, except such as I received from him for those of my own division. Brown was directed at once to cross Chattanooga creek (about 11 o'clock P. M.), Cumming at 1 o'clock, and Cheatham's division afterwards, all with directions to await further orders on the eastern side. General Cheatham then left me, as I understood, to get further orders from General Bragg.

About 12 o'clock at night, two staff officers of General Bragg's rode up to where I was (General Cumming's quarters), and stating that they could not find General Cheatham, handed me orders to him from General Bragg, to send all the troops that had been west of Chattanooga creek to the extreme right. This order was immediately given, and was executed as quickly as possible.

The conduct of the troops was all that could have been desired, and they accomplished all that could have been expected of them. The withdrawal of Walker's division, on the night of the 23d, in my opinion, rendered the position on the left untenable, opposed by so large a force, and it was beyond the power of the troops there to do more than to secure the road communicating with the top of the mountain until the general commanding the army could decide whether he would reinforce them sufficiently to hold the line or abandon it. His decision I have already given. The mountain was held till 2 o'clock of the next morning, and the troops, artillery and trains were withdrawn in order to the eastern side of Chattanooga creek.

Report of General E. C. Walthall.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, December 13, 1863.

Major JAMES D. PORTER, JR., A. A. G., *Cheatham's Division* :

Major—I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the affair on Lookout mountain, 24th November, 1863.

About dark, on the evening of the 23d, I received orders from Brigadier-General Commanding to hold my command in readiness to move at a moment's notice, and, later in the night, to have three days' rations prepared; but in view of the movements of the enemy on the previous day, my command, which occupied a position on the west side of Lookout mountain, and near the northern slope, was ordered to "stand to arms." Before daylight, on 24th of November, my picket line, which extended along Lookout creek from the turnpike bridge, near its mouth, to the railroad bridge across it, and thence up the mountain side to the cliff, was strengthened by increasing its reserves early in the morning, troops having been observed moving rapidly up the creek.

The fog, at that time, being very dense, it was impossible to estimate the numbers of the troops in motion, and this fact, as well as what seemed to be the state of things in Chattanooga and on the river, was reported to the Brigadier-General Commanding.

Shortly thereafter, the fog having been partially dissipated in the valley (though it still obscured the crest of the mountain above), with Brigadier-General Moore, the ranking officer at hand, I observed the movements of the enemy across Lookout creek, from a point near the right of my command, and saw a brigade take position in front of that part of my picket line between the two bridges, of which one regiment was thrown forward, and soon the pickets were engaged. Brigadier-General Moore returned to his command, it being agreed between us that he would notify the Brigadier-General Commanding of what had been observed. Rude breastworks of logs and stones had been constructed on the mountain side by the command which had occupied the ground before me, running parallel to the mountain and the creek, and along these my command, except the Thirty-fourth Mississippi regiment, with which the picket reserves had been strengthened, was formed awaiting the development of the enemy's purpose, it being uncertain whether he would pass across the creek on the right, as the movements discovered would seem to indicate, or would approach from the left of the crossing of the creek above the angle in my picket line, with the troops which had already moved in that direction. Soon after the firing commenced across the creek, two batteries, which had previously been erected on the ridge beyond Lookout creek (of which, in conversation with the Brigadier-General Commanding, I had more than once made mention), opened upon my main line, less than three-quarters of a mile distant; and while these batteries were shelling, two pieces of artillery were planted between the creek and the river, which, although across the creek from my picket line, was yet, by reason of the course of the stream, in rear of much of that part of the line which took the direction of the creek.

Major Johnson, commanding Thirtieth, and Colonel Brantley, commanding Twenty-ninth Mississippi regiments, occupying positions nearest to it, had been instructed to support that part of the picket line which extended up the mountain side from the railroad bridge, should the enemy approach from that direction, and the other regiments—Twenty-seventh Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, and Twenty-fourth Mississippi, under Colonel Dowd—were held ready to move to the right or left, as occasion might require. While writing a communication to inform the Brigadier-General Commanding of the position of the pieces in the angle of the creek (with the suggestion that a single piece, in a position which had been prepared for artillery, could silence them, and that this done, I thought I could hold the force in check), I received information through scouts sent out up the creek to observe the movements of the enemy, that a force had crossed the creek above

the angle in the picket line, I added this to the communication, and sent it to Brigadier-General Commanding by one of his staff officers. In the meantime, Brigadier-General Moore had applied to me to know the position of my line, as he was ordered to form on my right, and I learned from a staff officer of Brigadier-General Commanding, that such would be General Moore's position. I informed both where my line then was (and Captain Moreno, of the staff of the Brigadier-General Commanding, went with me, at my request, and looked at my position), but that the direction which would ultimately be given my line would necessarily depend upon the direction from which the enemy, then engaging my pickets on the right and threatening my left, almost at right angles to the part engaged, might make his main attack.

Meanwhile the firing from the batteries beyond the creek, which before had been irregular, became constant and heavy, and soon the enemy advanced on the left, in three lines running across the mountain side. Such a resistance as I could offer a force like this, consisting, as the Federal General Thomas, in an official dispatch to his Government says, of Geary's division and two brigades of another corps, was made with my small command, nearly one-third of which was covering a picket line more than a mile in extent. While Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Mississippi regiments, in support of the picket line, were resisting the enemy in the position assigned them (to cover which it had been necessary to take intervals), and when the immense numbers of the enemy had been discovered, the Twenty-seventh, and part of the Twenty-fourth Mississippi regiments were put in position several hundred yards in rear of the picket line, where, being sheltered from the enemy's small arms, and reserving their fire till the regiments and pickets in front had passed behind them in falling back, they delivered a destructive fire upon the advancing lines. The front line wavered, and then was broken at one point, but after falling back a short distance, it soon reformed, and despite my rapid and well directed fire, moved steadily and irresistibly forward, pressing heaviest upon my extreme left. I endeavored in falling back to turn the rocks and irregularities of the ground to the best account, for the protection of the men, and retiring from one position of strength to another, to yield the ground as slowly as possible, with the hope that support (for which I had sent to General Moore) might reach me. Many officers and men were captured, because they held their positions so long as to render escape impossible, the ground in their rear being rugged, rocky and covered with fallen timber.

My command being greatly sheltered, were enabled to inflict upon the enemy, as he advanced, a loss far greater than it sustained.

By 12 o'clock M., or about that time, and two and a half or three hours after the first picket firing began, I was driven to the ridge which runs down the Northern slope of the mountain, and here, with three companies of sharpshooters from the Twenty-fourth Mississippi regiment, which had previously been posted there

(and afterwards strengthened by another from the same regiment), I made an effort to retard the enemy's progress till the remainder of my command, including the pickets on the right, then in charge of Colonel J. A. Campbell, Twenty-seventh Mississippi regiment, could pass across the Northern slope of the mountain. The slope was commanded by the casemated batteries on Moccasin point, from which my command was constantly sheltered, from the time the slope was reached till they had passed across it. This passage was effected, in part, by means of a rifle pit, designed for the double purpose of a covered way and defence against an attack from a Northern direction, which runs across that part of the slope west of Craven's house, the sharpshooters on the ridge meanwhile resisting the enemy's advance as far as they were able, being themselves subjected to a heavy fire from the Moccasin guns.

After passing Craven's house, between half-past twelve and one o'clock P. M., or about that time, I dispatched a staff officer to Brigadier-General-Commanding to advise him of my movements. Most of my picket line to the right of the railroad bridge (which had been forced back upon the reserves in the rifle pits, at the foot of the mountain, and there were unable to check the force opposing them) were cut off, including the efficient officer in charge of it—an ineffectual effort having been made, as soon as the enemy began to overwhelm me on the left, to retire it up the steep mountain side, before the advancing lines, sweeping along the west side of the mountain, could occupy the slope near Craven's house.

The only pathway leading from the right of the picket line to Craven's house, ran up the creek to a point near the railroad bridge, and then obliquely in its general direction across the side of the mountain to the northern slope, forming an acute angle near the bridge. When the left was forced back, this angle was possessed by the enemy, and then the picket force on the right had to be withdrawn up a rugged, steep, broken, rocky and difficult passage, even for a footman at leisure.

The character of the ground making it impossible to communicate through mounted men with different parts of the line, the overwhelming force of the enemy, the advantageous positions of his batteries beyond the creek, the extent and direction of my picket line, and the fact that my only outlet, when forced to retire, was across a point commanded by the Moccasin guns, all assisted to create confusion, in the withdrawal of my command, to a point on the east side of the mountain, without the direct range of the enemy's guns.

The point selected was about four hundred yards from the Craven house; there my line extending from the road up to the cliff. About 1 o'clock P. M., I checked the enemy's advance, which was heaviest on my left, and was soon informed that reinforcements would be sent to me by a staff officer of Brigadier-General-Commanding. In the course of half an hour or three-quarters, Brigadier-General Pettus came up with his command in fine order, and

moved promptly upon the line I occupied, engaging the enemy at once and with spirit, and enabling me to withdraw my command and replenish my ammunition, then well-nigh exhausted, from my ordnance train, which I had ordered up to the road in my rear. This done, I formed my command, under cover, immediately in his rear for his support at such point as it might be needed. Soon afterwards, through one of his staff officers, he requested me to send him support on his left, and I immediately ordered Colonel Brantley, Twenty-ninth Mississippi regiment, with his own regiment, Thirtieth Mississippi, and a small detachment of the Thirty-fourth, to support this part of the line, and in a few moments the remainder of my command was moved up to strengthen the line, which along its whole length was hotly engaged. I directed Colonel Brantley to advance his left as far as it could be done without leaving an interval between his line and the cliff, so as to get the benefit of an oblique fire upon the line which was pressing upon us. This order was executed with that officer's usual promptness. In the meantime orders were received from Major-General Stevenson, through Major Ingram, of the staff of Brigadier-General Commanding, to hold the line then occupied till reinforcements should arrive, when an advance would be made, and the forces on the mountain would co-operate; and from Brigadier-General Commanding, through a staff officer, that the position would be held as long as possible, and if forced to retire, that I could fall back up the mountain. Later in the evening an order reached me from the latter to hold my position, if possible, till ordered to retire.

General Pettus' command and my own held the position all the afternoon (during the most of which time it was so hazy and misty that objects could not be well distinguished except at a short distance), and until long after nightfall, when, having been relieved by Colonel Holtzclaw, with his brigade, I withdrew my command to the road leading down the mountain road in the rear, and there remained till about 11 o'clock, when, under orders from Major-General Cheatham, I moved my command to McFarland's spring, where it passed the remainder of the night.

At no time during this prolonged struggle, whose object was to prevent the occupation by the enemy, first, of the important point near Craven's house, and afterwards the only road down the mountain leading from Major-General Stevenson's position to the main body of the army, did I have the benefit of my division commander's personal presence. Reference has been made to such orders as reached me from him after I was relieved, and while awaiting orders to move, I saw him for the first time, on his way, as he told me, to see the General-in-Chief.

The casualties in my command cannot be correctly reported, inasmuch as the killed, and many of the wounded, fell into the enemy's hands. The accompanying list, to which I respectfully refer, only shows among the killed and wounded such as were known certainly to be so, and cannot, for want of positive infor-

mation, embrace a large number, particularly of the pickets and their reserves on the right, who are supposed to have fallen, as they were long subjected to a very heavy fire from both artillery and small arms, but of whose loss, further than they fell into the enemy's hands, no report can be had.

I regret that, for want of a competent person to prepare one, I am unable to submit an accurate map of the ground I occupied, and its surroundings, as it would contribute greatly to a perfect understanding of movements and events as related.

No copies of the dispatches forwarded during the morning having been retained, and as I am unable to obtain such now, I have been compelled to refer to them from memory. The officers and men of my command, with a few exceptions, did their duty well in this engagement; but it is due in particular to commend Colonel W. F. Brantley, Twenty-ninth Mississippi regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Mackelvaine, Twenty-fourth Mississippi regiment, for the skill, activity, zeal and courage, I have ever observed in them under similar circumstances, but which, in an especial degree, signalized their action on this occasion. The latter officer was not with his regiment during the engagement west of the mountain, having been previously assigned to duty on the picket line, where he rendered me important aid. Major John Ingram, Assistant Adjutant-General to Brigadier-General Commanding, was with me during most of the afternoon, and I am pleased here to signify my high appreciation of his gallantry, and the valuable assistance I received at his hands, in his bearing my orders and otherwise. To Lieutenants James C. Harrison, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, and George M. Govern, Assistant Inspector-General of my own staff, I am indebted for the promptness, gallantry and efficiency with which all their duties upon the field were discharged.

I submit herewith the reports of regimental commanders, showing many details not incorporated herein.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. C. WALTHALL, *Brigadier-General.*

The Battle of Williamsburg and the Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia of Early's Brigade.

By Colonel R. L. MAURY.

The Immortal Twenty-fourth.—The Yankee General Hancock said that the Fifth North Carolina and the Twenty-fourth Virginia, for their conduct in battle before Williamsburg, ought to have this word inscribed upon their banners. The Twenty-fourth in the fight of yesterday vindicated its title to this honor. * * * * *—*Richmond Enquirer*, June 2, 1862.

The narratives of Colonel Bratton, of the Sixth South Carolina, and of Colonel McRae, of the Fifth North Carolina, published in the *Papers* of the Southern Historical Society for June and August last, describing the charge made by a small part of Early's brigade [the Twenty-fourth Virginia, supported by the Fifth North Carolina] at Williamsburg, upon a redoubt on our extreme left, defended by General Hancock with five regiments and ten guns, affords a proper occasion to record an account of the achievements there of the Twenty-fourth Virginia infantry, which bore the principal part in that action. This regiment opened the attack, drove the enemy before it, although his force was eight or ten times theirs, silenced his fire, and having advanced within twenty yards of the redoubt, was only stopped by orders from the division commander. Its daring and its dash won from the Major-General (D. H. Hill) this hearty commendation: "The courage exhibited by the Fifth North Carolina and the Twenty-fourth Virginia made too a wonderful impression upon the Yankees, and doubtless much of the caution exhibited in their subsequent movements was due to the terror inspired by the heroism of these noble regiments. History has no example of a more daring charge. * * * * * It contributed largely to detain McClellan, to demoralize his troops and to secure our retreat from a vigorous and harassing pursuit." And the commander of the forces attacked, General Hancock, declared that it should bear the word "immortal" upon its banner forever.

The authors of the narratives referred to have failed to give this regiment the exceedingly prominent and conspicuous place in that charge to which accident and its own valor entitle it. The charge of Early's brigade was the charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, and the enemy's whole resistance was directed against its attack. This is evidenced by the fact that its whole heavy loss was incurred in its advance, while the Fifth North Carolina, the only other regiment of the brigade in the fight, in its gallant *advance*

to support these Virginians, suffered scarcely at all, although in *returning* its losses were perhaps heavier. The writer, therefore, formerly Colonel of these sturdy mountaineers [at that time Major and commanding during the latter part of the action—Colonels Terry and Hairston having been wounded], feels that his duty to his gallant comrades, who so freely shed their blood on every field from Manassas to Appomattox, demands that he should show their title to the pre-eminence won by their valiant deeds in the estimation of friend and foe, and preserve in lasting memorial the proofs thereof. The more so, perhaps, because, owing chiefly to the active campaign upon which it then entered, no report or description, so far as known, of the part taken by this regiment at Williamsburg, has ever been made. None of the writer's superior officers witnessed the entire fight, for all were wounded before its close, and being himself wounded a few weeks afterwards at Seven Pines, he made no detached report of the Williamsburg charge. A very thrilling account was published by the newspapers of the day of the part taken by the Fifth North Carolina, which attracted much attention and is now on record; so that the future historian, unless a careful critic as well, finding no description of the charge of the Virginians, would naturally conclude that they bore but a subordinate part.

The Twenty-fourth Virginia infantry was one of the very first organized of the Virginia regiments. It was composed of companies raised in the mountain counties of Southwest Virginia, and as General Early was its first colonel, it was, particularly in the first days of the war, often spoken of as Early's regiment. It was formed in June, 1861, at Lynchburg, and proceeded forthwith to Manassas, where its Colonel was soon given a brigade, to which this regiment was attached. The appearance of this brigade upon the enemy's left flank at Manassas is stated by General Beauregard to have been the signal for the giving way of his line and the commencement of his flight.

The regiment remained encamped near Union mills during the following winter, picketing the railroad near Burk's and Fairfax stations, and in the spring moved with the army to the Rappahannock and then down on the Peninsula. When it reached the Yorktown lines, it mustered for duty some seven hundred muskets. Its field officers were Colonel William R. Terry, of Bedford, promoted from captain of cavalry for gallantry at Manassas, a dashing soldier of many a battle whose scars he bears to this day; Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Hairston, of Henry, a very Bayard in looks

and bearing, who was desperately wounded in the forefront of the charge at Williamsburg, and Major Richard L. Maury, of Richmond, the writer.

The regiment served with increasing distinction from Manassas to Appomattox Courthouse. In the van at the former, it was also at the post of duty and honor at the latter, where its few ragged, battle scarred, limping survivors, heroes of a hundred victories, with hearts still as stout and courage as high as ever, with the writer, then their Colonel, laid down those bright muskets and gleaming bayonets which had been so eagerly seized just four years before to defend the rights and liberties of their dear Virginia, and with which so well had they done their *devoir* that even in submission the world admired and all brave hearts applauded their dauntless deeds.

At odd times, when the Army of Northern Virginia was inactive, the brigade of which this regiment formed part—and which, from its earliest engagements, seemed to have attracted the attention of its commanders and gained their special confidence—went to Suffolk, North Carolina and Drury's Bluff in successful quests of glory and renown. After it was reorganized in 1862, Kemper commanded it, and Pickett was its Major-General until the sad disaster at Five Forks (1865).

At Yorktown Early held the lines just outside the village. Out-numbered as the Confederates were, the incessant duty necessarily imposed upon them in picketing, skirmishing and constant watching by night and day without relief, was wearing and arduous in the extreme. The weather was wet, the troops without shelter, the trenches full of mud and water and the supplies but scant. This exposure and hardship, greater than they had ever borne and so different from their snug quarters at Manassas, was quickly followed by sickness and disease, so that during the three weeks in the Yorktown trenches the seven hundred muskets of the Twenty-fourth Virginia were reduced to something like five hundred effectives.

On the retreat to Williamsburg, commencing the night of May 3d, Early's brigade was the rear guard—and the Twenty-fourth, being the left regiment, brought up the rear of all—the most fatiguing place, as every soldier knows, of the whole line of march.

All this was truly an ill preparation for the desperate charge to be set before them so soon; but let it not be forgotten in reckoning the glory of their deeds.

The horrible roads are well remembered even now by all who passed them on that dark and rainy night. There had been constant rains for weeks and ceaseless use of every highway all the while. The mud and water were ankle and sometimes knee deep, and infantry were often called to help the weary horses drag wagons and artillery from holes and ruts in which the wheels had sunk up to the very axles. So the march was tedious and dragging and slow. The men fell asleep on the wayside as they halted for a moment, and sometimes not a mile in an hour was made. Thus morning found them scarcely half way to Williamsburg [fourteen miles], and midday had long gone by ere the rear passed through the gray old town, and, weary and jaded, were allowed to take whatever of rest a halt in an open field a mile or so beyond and a tentless bivouac in the pelting rain might afford. Supperless but not to sleep they lay upon the soaking ground that night, and without breakfast, weary, wet and hungry, but jolly in spirits, they are ready at daylight to resume their march.

General Johnston had no intention of tarrying at Williamsburg, nor was the place defensible, for the enemy now had control of both James and York rivers on either flank and intended to push Franklin's division (30,000), kept on transports below Yorktown so as to move in a minute, rapidly up the York to West Point in the vain hope of getting in our rear. Our orders were that Magruder should not halt at all and that the other divisions should take up their march to the Chickahominy at early dawn—Longstreet being in the rear. So Smith moved on at day, then the trains followed, and Hill's infantry were filing into the road when orders came to halt and then to return to town.

The enemy's van had come up and was disposed to skirmish with the rear guard—fresh troops were arriving every moment—there was no time to wait to deliver a regular battle, for Franklin was already sailing up the York—but our trains were not well away and 'twas deemed prudent for Hill to tarry as Longstreet might need aid; doubtless, too, General Johnston was not unwilling to turn and deal the enemy a blow to show how little demoralization his backward movement created, and how, though in retreat, his men were quite as ready and as able too to fight as when on a victorious advance. Thus Hill's trains went on, but his infantry and some artillery returned to Williamsburg and the former stacked their arms upon the college green and passed the day in waiting and expectancy, while the rain still fell and fell.

Longstreet was being pressed more vigorously, the skirmish was becoming a fight just beyond the town and could be distinctly heard by all, and wounded and ambulances and prisoners passed frequently by. Every one looked for orders to the front each moment; amid such scenes and sounds the tension of expectation and excitement was most intense; meantime evening, dark, gloomy and cloudy, drew slowly on, when, suddenly, about three o'clock galloped up the looked for courier. "Move quickly to the support of Longstreet," said he.

And now were seen a series of blunders by generals which, as often after, the priceless lives of our gallant soldiers were sacrificed to correct, and which in this brilliant Williamsburg charge caused the useless slaughter of the very flower of Early's brigade—for though it need never have been made, yet it ought to have been a grand success, and to have resulted in the easy capture of Hancock's whole command, had due precaution been taken before commencing the attack and proper skill displayed in arranging, conducting and supporting it after it had been commenced. To make this clear one should recall the surrounding circumstances.

The prudent forethought of General J. B. Magruder, who, with his troops, had so successfully held the lines from Yorktown to Mulberry island since the war began, had caused the construction of a cordon of redoubts just below Williamsburg, running entirely across the Peninsula from Queen's creek of York to James river. Commencing near Saunder's pond on the York side near where the road crosses it, this line runs northwest for a mile or more, in which space are three redoubts; then due west some three hundred yards, passing another to Fort Magruder with several outlying smaller works, and thence westwardly in an irregular course, skirting a stream and swamp, some two miles more, passing six redoubts to the road leading to Allen's wharf on Jame river. The centre of this line was Fort Magruder, a large, well constructed closed earth-work, located about one mile from Williamsburg on the main road running down the Peninsula, which, just beyond, falls into the Yorktown and the Warwick roads.

The redoubts to the right, on the James river side, were all occupied by Longstreet's division, which relieved Hill—guarding the rear on the 4th—and whose obvious duty was to cover all the lines on which the enemy could advance. But this was not done; for on the morning of the 5th none of these left works were occu-

pied in force, and only one or two of the nearest even with pickets.*

Thus the left of the Confederate line of works, like that of the English at Preston Pass, was undefended, and one of the few passes across the swamps stretching along its front remained entirely open to the enemy. The redoubt constructed expressly to guard this passage seems not to have been considered worth a thought in the morning, when it could have been occupied without a loss, while in the evening the lives of hundreds of the best of soldiers were thrown away in a fruitless attempt to regain it.

Why were these redoubts not occupied? They were constructed for just such an occasion; for it was well known that the Yorktown lines would have to be evacuated sooner or later. General Johnston, in his narrative, pages 122-4, says he knew nothing of them, and so does Longstreet, and Hill, and Anderson, although they were all charged with their defence. Each is in sight from the other, and all are in a continuously open space. McLaws, of Longstreet's division, who occupied this part of the line the afternoon before with Kershaw's and Semmes' brigades, knew of them, for Colonel Marigny, with his Tenth Louisiana, occupied this very work [see McLaws' report of the battle of Williamsburg] until relieved by R. H. Anderson. Colonel Bratton, of the Sixth South Carolina, of Anderson's brigade, whose regiment was posted near the glacis of Fort Magruder, knew of them; for he reported them unoccupied [see his narrative—*Southern Historical Society Papers*, June, 1879]. It would be interesting to know to whom he made this report. He also saw the Yankees later in the day take possession of that on the extreme left. Moreover, all the army had entered this entrenched line at Fort Magruder, and when preparing to defend it, surely common prudence, not to say ordinary generalship, should have suggested the importance of ascertaining the position of its flanks; and it should not have been presumed, as seems to have been done, that so skilful a soldier as General Magruder had constructed but half a line of fortifications. And, indeed, the Commanding-General knew from the time he went to Yorktown, or very soon thereafter, that his army would soon withdraw [see Johnston's narrative, page 116], and this was the only road. It was apparent, too, that at or about Williamsburg would be the first halt, and it was to be expected that the enemy's van would come

* See Colonel Bratton's statement, *Southern Historical Papers*, June, 1879, page 299. General Anderson says in his report: "My not occupying these redoubt was perhaps a mistake, but I did not understand Longstreet's orders to include them."

up with our rear here. If 'twas "prudent to construct these works" [Johnston's narrative], would it not also have been prudent to ascertain their location?

But it is even stranger how Longstreet could have remained in ignorance of them, for they were in actual sight from Fort Magruder, where he must have been both on the 4th and 5th. As McLaws occupied them on the 4th, why did not Anderson, who relieved him, occupy all the posts he occupied? Who relieved Marigny's Tenth Louisiana and how came that relief to be withdrawn afterwards? Can it be that Bratton, who was posted on the Confederate left on the 4th and 5th, relieved Marigny, who occupied this position, and that he was also in fault in not having occupied this left redoubt also? But all these mistakes, growing out of ignorance or carelessness, might have been avoided had General Magruder been assigned to the defence of the rear on that day, for he and his troops were perfectly familiar with the whole country—they had been stationed here all the previous autumn and winter, and had themselves laid out and built these very fortifications.

As the Confederate army entered these lines about noon of the 4th, Longstreet, who led the van, and, by the usual routine, would be in the rear next day, halted just within, while the remainder of the forces marched on past Williamsburg. In the afternoon the enemy's van appeared, driving in the cavalry, and McLaws, with Semmes' and Kershaw's brigades, went back to these lines, and the Yankee van retired. That evening McLaws was relieved, as already said, by R. H. Anderson, commanding the brigades of Anderson and Pryor. In the morning, after much skirmishing, without advantage to the enemy, he appeared on the right in force under Hooker, attacking with spirit, but, though reinforced by Kearney, he was pressed back, driven and almost routed.* Here was fighting pretty much all day, but night found Longstreet holding his position, while the enemy seemed cured of any desire to again molest the Confederate rear.†

* Testimony before Congressional Committee on Conduct of War. Part I, pages 353-556.

† On the retreat the van of to-day is the rear guard to-morrow. Such was the custom of the Army of Northern Virginia—and Longstreet having led the first day, was rear guard the second. Was he in *front* at starting because General Johnston had found him, as afterwards General Lee did, "slow to move," and therefore started him first? Possibly, for the evacuation of the Yorktown lines had been ordered on a previous night, and D. H. Hill had moved out bag and baggage at the appointed time for a mile or more, but was then halted until nearly day, and then ordered back to his former position. Fortunately the enemy had not discovered his absence—a bit of rare good luck not to have been expected. It was then currently reported that the waiting had been for Longstreet, and as he had not moved out in time for the army to get well away before dawn, it was necessary to return.

Sumner, with 30,000 men, had also come up early on the 5th, but had sat quietly down across the Yorktown road, just out of sight and range. Although in command—for McClellan seems to have considered that the position for the general-in-chief on a pursuit was fifteen miles in rear, and had remained below Yorktown*—he took no part in what was going on around him; and though importuned for aid by both Hooker and Kearney, who were "almost routed," he declined to part with a man; and when Hancock, finding the empty redoubt on the left, ventured into it, he actually commanded him to return. In fact, he seems to have forgotten that he was in pursuit of what was described as a flying and demoralized enemy, and though himself in command, and holding the van, his chief object on finding the foe seems to have been to let him well alone.

Not so Hancock, one of his subordinates, who was made of sterner stuff, and who had other views of the duties of pursuers of a flying foe; for on the morning of the 5th, between 10 and 11 o'clock, leaving Sumner at Whittaker's, full half a mile or more from the nearest Confederate line, he takes his own brigade and part of Naglee's—five regiments—and ten guns, in all probably over 4,000 men, and learning that one of the redoubts on the extreme left of the Confederate line was unoccupied, he crosses Saunders' pond and marches into it, and then, in the language of the Comte de Paris, "seeing no enemy, he fearlessly proceeded to march into the next." But on approaching it, he perceives Bratton, with part of his Sixth South Carolina, preparing to oppose him, whereupon, although in far greater force, he halts, falls back, and calls for aid. But Sumner seems to have been in no mood to detain the "flying foe," and orders Hancock to retire. The latter, well knowing the lucky prize he had found, determined to stay; so falling back from the "fearless advance," spoken of by the Comte de Paris, to the redoubt he first occupied, he makes his dispositions for a stand, and Bratton, with commendable care, that might well have been imitated that day by others of higher rank, extends a line of pickets from his main body across Hancock's front and into the woods beyond. The latter gets his guns into battery, and occasionally throws a chance shot or shell here and there at a venture, but with but little damage, if any. Thus the day wore on. Towards evening, this artillery fire becoming somewhat annoying to Fort Ma-

*Evidence of Governor Sprague and others before Congressional Committee on Conduct of War.

gruder, 'tis said, although Hancock showed no signs of making use of the position he had stumbled upon, which, in fact, was the key to the entire Confederate line, and opened to the enemy a road to Williamsburg, as well as to Longstreet's rear, D. H. Hill and Early, anxious to have a share in the day's work, asked and obtained leave to assault General Hancock and drive him away. There appears to have been no necessity for this, however, for Hancock's fire had done no damage all day, and was not more harmful now—the fighting was well-nigh over—and he himself was preparing to fall back further for the night. (See Hancock's report, battle of Williamsburg.) The Confederates had beaten off every attack made upon them, and the whole line was to be abandoned before morning. Nevertheless the leave was given, with a charge from General Johnston "to be careful."

Forthwith Hill brings his command to the front. Early's brigade, eager for the first of a hundred battles, coming from the college green at the double-quick through the narrow streets of the old historic town, where the cheers and the tears of the women and the maidens at doors and windows waving adieux, as they pass so quickly by, and the unaccustomed sight of dead, wounded and prisoners brought up from the field to which they were hurrying, the rapid motion, the galloping of artillery, couriers and staff, with all the burning excitement of the approach to battle, sent the blood coursing through their veins, which tingles even now as but the memory of it all flushes the cheek and brightens the eye, though eighteen long years have passed away.

The brigade hurries half a mile or more down the Yorktown road, files short to the left, passes through a newly plowed, soft and muddy field half a mile further, and forming into line behind a wood, which screens from sight all beyond, breathless, hot and heavy of foot from rapid motion over such a ground, halts and prepares to load. Thus formed, it consists of the following regiments, counting from the right: The Fifth and Twenty-third North Carolina, commanded respectively by Colonels Duncan K. McRae and Hoke; and the Thirty-eighth and Twenty-fourth Virginia, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Powhatan B. Whittle and Colonel William R. Terry; the Twenty-fourth Virginia being thus on the left, and the Fifth North Carolina on the right. This brigade is assigned to the attack, and the remainder of the division—the brigades of Rodes, Featherston and Rains, with the second company of Richmond howitzers—is held in reserve close by. Major-

General D. H. Hill will lead and takes special charge of the right wing, the two North Carolina regiments; and the Virginians, of the left, will be led by General Early.

Regardless of the rule which places commanding officers in *rear* of the line in a charge, Early, with his staff, takes position in *front* of his old regiment, the Twenty-fourth, and its field-officers, all mounted, do likewise. The order is given to load and then to fix bayonets—and the guns are loaded and the bayonets fixed. In a few words, Early, addressing his men, says they are to assault and capture a battery "over there," pointing to the woods—and grimly adding, that their safest place, after getting under fire, will be at the very guns themselves; advises all to get there as quickly as possible. Expectation is on tiptoe, and many a gallant heart, in generous emulation, resolves to be the first to reach these guns. With only these few moments of halt to regain breath, the order is given to march, and the line moves forward.*

The generals did not know the position of the redoubt to be attacked, nor even its exact direction from where the line was formed; yet no skirmishers were thrown forward to discover it, nor was any proper reconnoissance made.† The latter might easily have been done, for from the point where Bratton was with the Sixth South Carolina, he had a view of the whole field, and his pickets extended from his redoubt into the woods whence Early's brigade was soon to emerge. But these ordinary precautions do not seem to have been thought of, and the Major-General, arranging his forces to attack a strong enemy in a strong position, only to be approached across a large open boggy field (in his report he says it was half a mile wide), without knowledge of their numbers or location, and without reconnoissance or skirmishes, sounded the charge and ordered the advance. The disposition of the supports were made with equal lack of skill, for the three additional brigades and the battery of artillery, as brave and gallant soldiers as ever fired a gun, though close at hand, were never brought upon the field at all, and the attack failed for want of their aid. They were ample for the purpose, for they outnumbered the foe, and were quite sufficient to have captured General Hancock and his five regiments

* This little halt was even briefer for the writer and his part of the regiment than for the other portions of the brigade. In the run down from Williamsburg, the line had become open and much extended. The Twenty-fourth Virginia was in the rear, and the writer's part of it in rear of all; so that when the halt was made, and line of battle formed, it was the last to get into position, and had barely time to load before the march forward began.

† Colonel Bratton's narrative, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, June, 1879, pages 299-300. Colonel McCrae's narrative, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, August, 1879, page 364.

and ten guns, one and all, who were far in advance of General Sumner, and who could only retreat by a narrow road over Saunders' pond.

From all this want of generalship, skill and care, arose great confusion and greater misfortune. Not knowing exactly the location of the point of attack, it was scarcely possible that the line of battle would be properly arranged with regard to it, and so it happened; for when at last it came in sight of the enemy, instead of the centre being opposite the point attacked, as should have been, with the line moving directly upon it, the extreme left (the left of the Twenty-fourth Virginia) was opposite the battery, and the remainder of the brigade away off to the right, and moving in a direction across the enemy's front. These sturdy old musketeers—some of whom were not inapt military scholars, and by dint of comparing notes, careful observation, and an occasional book or two, had learned as well how a battle should be set in order as many a general officer—understood from the advance being thus commenced without skirmishers, and from General Early's little address before starting, that they were as close upon the position to be attacked as could be, that the charge commenced then and there, that the battery to be taken was just over the wood, a hundred yards distant perhaps, and that they would fall upon the foe in a moment.

With this impression upon their minds, it was difficult to restrain the impatient valor and restlessness of the men as they moved off, but still they advanced across the field steadily, and, preserving their alignment well, though with more rapid step, they entered the woods. Here the miry ground, the dense and tangled undergrowth, dripping with wet, and the large fallen timber, somewhat impaired the line, which increasing excitement, running higher every moment, which was thought would bring them under fire, rendered it difficult for the officers to correct. Still every one pressed forward with all the strength he had left; there was no halting, only greater speed, though every moment less breath and more fatigue. But no enemy is seen yet. They have left the field whence they started, they have traversed the tangled woods down the hill, across a county road, into the forest again and up another slope, but heavy, weary, breathless, and almost broken down, and still no foe is found, although half a mile and more has been passed. But now light appears ahead, the trees are thinner, and a large open field is seen towards the right and in front. It is there

that the redoubt and the battery and the enemy must be. The glorious Virginians press forward towards it, and in a moment more are on the edge of the opening, seeing before them, like a picture, the cordon of Confederate redoubts stretching away to Fort Magruder; that on the extreme left, directly in face of the left of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, is occupied by the enemy, whose entire force of five regiments and ten guns are well advanced in the field directly in front of it. As yet the Confederates have not been noticed. Ah! why were not these brave spirits marched quietly to this point and formed, where all could have seen and clearly understood the work before them! then indeed would it have been done, and well done, and done quickly.

The enemy is seen for the first time; for the first time is seen the battery to be taken. His line faces rather to the southwest, while the advance is from the west. Owing to the unfortunate manner in which the attack was arranged, the Twenty-fourth alone sights the enemy, is much nearer to him, and issues from the woods some time before any other part of the brigade. Immediately upon seeing the Yankees, they spring forward into the open with renewed energy, and remembering the address of Early, who is riding just before them, they press heartily onwards to lose not a moment in closing with those ten guns and four thousand muskets of General Winfield Hancock.

But the wild advance, at such a foolish speed, and over such a heavy ground, had brought disorder on the line. The two middle regiments are not to be seen, and do not issue from the woods at all during the entire action, while the right regiment, Colonel McRae's, does not reach the open until the Twenty-fourth Virginia had been well engaged for some time and was driving the enemy back; and when it does enter the field, 'tis far to the right where no enemy was, and, in fact, in rear of Bratton's line.

Thus, as it leaves the woods, the Twenty-fourth Virginia, alone and unsupported, with both flanks in the air, finds itself confronted by ten guns, defended by five regiments of infantry, with a strong redoubt in their rear. Clinging instinctively to the skirt of woods bordering the field on its left flank, so as to mask its weakness as well as might be, and opening out its files as far as possible to cover the foe's five regiments, these fearless mountaineers break at once into the double-quick and charge with a wild cheer that thrills through every heart. At once they are heavily engaged. In opening their files, several of the largest companies on the right

became detached, and mistaking the redoubt held by Bratton for the objective point, rushed towards it.* But the remainder go straight on, and the brunt of the affair falls upon the left wing, led by the writer, they being closest to and moving directly upon the foe, and receiving the fire both from front and flank. The advanced force delivered a steady volley at most uncomfortably short range and then give way, retreating towards the redoubt. As they retire, the guns, which have already been hurried back, again open; and these Virginians, but a portion of the Twenty-fourth regiment, weary and breathless, already shattered by shot and shell, receive Hancock's whole fire of musketry, shell, grape and canister, as, pressing over the field with undaunted courage, they approach nearer and nearer the foe. None halt or hesitate, but all rush forward with a vigor hardly to be paralleled and now with a silence that would do honor to the first veterans on record, though to many 'tis their first fight. A spirit of death or victory animates every bosom; and mindful of Early's advice, each one anxious to be the first at these guns, they still press on, not so quickly, perhaps, as they would have done had they not been exhausted by their run through field and forest, but still without delay, and the enemy all the while gives way before them, though some of his regiments tarry longer than others.

The leaden hail was fearful; it poured in from front and either flank, and for the first time was heard the barbarous explosive bullet which the Yankees introduced and used. The artillery, too, was well served, and soon both grape and canister were cutting through the wheat with a terribly suggestive sound, carrying down many a brave spirit, and men and officers fell dead and wounded on every side. Yet the advance is maintained; down a slope first, and up again on the further side—still on and on. The regiment soon finds that it is alone; it knows that "some one has blundered," and marvels that the supports are nowhere seen, and that the Major-General, with his part of the brigade, does not appear. Still none falter or cast a look behind. They are pressing the enemy well back, though receiving deadly wounds meantime, for his attention is engrossed by this attack, and the Virginians are drawing his

* This separation furnishes the explanation of part of Colonel Bratton's somewhat involved account of this affair in the *Historical Society Papers* for June, 1879. He speaks of the "Twenty-fourth regiment" and of "Early's regiment" as if they were two regiments, mistaking these companies thus separated for a distinct regiment. The officer he speaks of as Lieutenant-Colonel Early was doubtless the gallant Captain Sam. Henry Early, of General Early's staff.—H. E. M.

whole fire. Gray-haired old Coltraine, of Carrol, that gallant, staunch old soldier, is well in front, his colors already pierced with many a bullet, and men and officers press quickly on unchecked by the murderous fire directed upon them. The ground is soft and yielding; the wheat half knee high, drenched with rain, clings heavily to the legs, and many trip and stumble and sometimes fall. The flag staff is shattered, but Coltraine grasps the staff and cheerily waves the siken folds in front. Away to the right is seen the gallant Fifth North Carolina coming up at the double-quick to our aid, led by that *preaux chevalier*, Colonel Duncan McRae, his horse briskly trotting in advance. A cheer bursts forth and all take heart and still press forward. But the Virginians are much nearer the redoubt, and the enemy, regardless of the approaching supports, still concentrated all their fire upon this devoted band, and with terrible effect. Early's horse has been shot, and in another moment he himself receives a wound, the effect of which his bended form still shows. Terry, too, that gallant leader, ever in the van of many an after battle, has gotten the first of frequent shots full in the face, and the dauntless Hairston also goes down desperately wounded; so the writer, then but a youth, finds himself for the first time in command of his regiment, and the only mounted officer there.* Captains Jennings and Haden, and Lieutenant Mansfield, too, the bravest of all these braves, lie dead upon the ground. Lieutenant Willie Radford, soldier and scholar, has freely given up his young life, so full of bloom and promise, in defence of home and dear native land, and lies with his face up to heaven and his feet to the foe, his noble brow, so lately decked with University honors, now pale and cold in death, and his Captain [afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel Bently], ever present in the field from Manassas even to Appomattox, fell bleeding by his side many yards in front of their company, and Captain Lybrock and Lieutenant Shockley, too, fall wounded to the earth. But no pause is made. Ten minutes—fifteen—have passed while they cross that field of blood, and every other man is down. But the supports are approaching; not all the rest of the brigade, as was expected—or a part of the division, fresh and in order—but only a single regiment, the gallant Fifth North Carolina, who, seeing what odds the Virginians were fighting, had, as soon as it emerged into the field and found no enemy confronting them, sought leave to march towards

*The Fifth North Carolina, with all its mounted officers, had not yet gotten up to the more advanced position of the Twenty-fourth Virginia.

the firing and were now hastening to an awful destruction in their zeal to share that glorious field. The enemy, too, fall back more quickly as they see reinforcements coming up, and run into and behind the redoubt, to which they have all retreated now. Confusion has seized upon them there, for the Virginians are within twenty yards and show no signs of halting. The fire of the enemy slackens, and as their assailants reach the fence of substantial rails with a rider, ceases entirely. The order to their artillery to "cease firing" and "limber up" is distinctly heard, and some of the guns are actually run off; the infantry, too, are in great tumult, their bayonets seem tangled and interlocked, some run into the fort, many make off to the rear, and voices calling to others to halt and stand steady are clearly heard. In a word, General Winfield Hancock's five regiments and ten guns have been attacked and driven in by a single Virginia regiment, and are now on the point of being routed.

As the Twenty-fourth gains the fence just spoken of, the enemy having ceased firing entirely, it pauses a moment to breathe and reform its scattered line, preparatory to a last dash—no man thinks of turning back, for the enemy is retreating before them—and here, too, now are their gallant comrades fresh and eager for a share in the struggle. While the men were in the act of climbing this fence, the writer seeking a gap where his horse could pass, Adjutant McRae communicated to him General Hill's order to retire immediately; whereupon, anticipating that the enemy would reform and open with terrible effect at such short range as soon as the backward movement was perceived, the regiment was obliqued into the woods upon which its left flank rested, and, retiring thus under cover, came off without further damage.

Not so its gallant comrades, who, having advanced with but little loss, and just rectified their alignment behind the fence, were now in perfect line right under the enemy's guns. Their retreat was across a broad, open field; and as they faced about, the foe, quickly rallying and reforming, more than five or six times their number, hurled shot and shell through their devoted ranks with awful destruction. The retreat was the signal for slaughter, and, as Colonel McRae says, the regiment "was scarcely harmed at all *till* the retreat began"—the loss was desperate in a few moments afterwards. [*Southern Historical Society Papers*, August, 1879, page 362.] Before they recrossed that fearful field, the best blood of all the Old North State fed the fresh young wheat at their feet, and a hundred Carolina homes were cast into direful mourning and distress.

And all for what? Had the regiments been allowed to go on, the redoubt would have been captured without further loss, and held until some one had thought of reinforcing them with part of the three remaining brigades of the division, or with the other two regiments of their own brigade, all of whom were within a thousand yards. If McRae had not come up, and by sending his Adjutant back, furnished the Major-General with a ready messenger, by whom to order the troops to retire, it seems that the Twenty-fourth regiment would have been left, as had already been done, to press forward alone until it reached the works, into which a few might have gotten, as they afterwards did at Gettysburg, in the great charge of Pickett's division, where, by a singular coincidence, the line attacked was in charge of this same General Hancock. Then, as at Williamsburg, a handful left to dash themselves to atoms upon the enemy's entrenchments, while abundant support, stood quietly by and watched the fruitless onslaught.

Well, indeed, might friend and foe write highest laudations of so gallant a charge! rarely equalled, and never surpassed, in all the resplendent record of that ever glorious army. The blow thus delivered, at the very opening of that memorable campaign, not only stunned the enemy—who never attacked again on the Peninsula!—but furnished the whole army with an inspiring example, which could not but have an admirable effect.

The glowing language of General Hill's report has already been cited. Colonel (now General) Bratton, who was an eye-witness of the whole affair [although he seems to have had but a confused recollection of the regiments engaged], says: "The Twenty-fourth Virginia meantime emerged from the wood nearer the enemy than my redoubt, and moved in fine style upon them. * * * I have never on any field, during the war, seen more splendid gallantry exhibited than on that field at Williamsburg." [*Southern Historical Society Papers*, June, 1879, pages 301-2.] And a captain of Her Majesty's Scotch Fusileers, who was in Hancock's redoubt, and saw the charge, made himself known next day to Dr. George T. Harrison, Surgeon of the Twenty-fourth, left at Williamsburg to attend the wounded, saying that he did so because he understood the Doctor belonged to the Twenty-fourth Virginia, and he desired to tell him that during his entire Crimean experience, he had never seen more gallantry displayed upon a field of battle.

Nor were the foes unwilling to declare their admiration or to testify to the impression made upon them by these dashing soldiers.

General Hancock declared that they should have "immortal" written upon their banner forever; and although he had, as already said, five regiments of infantry and ten guns—4,000 men—he called loudly and frequently for reinforcements, which, to the extent of three brigades (Smith's two and Naglee's), General McClellan sent him immediately after his arrival from the rear.* The latter considered this action the most important of the entire battle. He made it the chief subject of his first two telegrams to Lincoln, pronouncing Hancock's conduct brilliant in the extreme (his loss was only twenty). And in his official report, written more than a year afterwards, he characterized it as one of the most brilliant engagements of the war, and declared that General Hancock merited the highest praise! So far from pressing the Confederates, as he had boasted he would do, after this day's work he sat quietly down in the ancient borough of Williamsburg, while these same "demoralized and flying" Confederates sauntered up to the Chickahominy at their leisure, pausing on the route to *reorganize* their regiments whose period of service had expired, and to elect their officers! Nor did General McClellan ever again try the experiment of attacking General Johnston's men.

A few days after (May 9, 1862) the following animated account of the charge appeared in the columns of the New York *Herald*:

* * * "From the sharp fire of our skirmishers in the woods on our left, came the first information of a movement in that direction, and thus put all on the alert. * * * The fire grew hotter in the woods, and in a few moments, at a point fully half a mile away from the battery, the enemy's men began to file out of the cover and form in the open field. It was a bold and proved an expensive way to handle men. Wheeler opened his guns on the instant, and the swath of dead that subsequently marked the course of that brigade across the open field began at that spot. At the same moment also our skirmishers in the field began their fire. Still the enemy formed across the opening with admirable rapidity and precision, and as coolly too as if the fire had been directed elsewhere, and then came on at the double-quick step in three distinct lines†, firing as they came. All sounds were lost for a few moments in the short roar of the field-pieces, and in the scattered rattle and rapid repetition of the musketry. Naturally their fire could do us but little harm under the circumstances, and so we had

* It is noteworthy, that although McClellan's army was in pursuit of a retiring foe, he himself, instead of being in the van, remained below Yorktown, nearly twenty miles away, during the entire fight.—R. L. M.

† A mistake, for the Twenty-fourth Virginia was the only regiment making the attack from this point.—R. L. M.

them at a fair advantage, and every nerve was strained to make the most of it. Still they came on. They were dangerously near. Already our skirmishers on the left had fallen back to their line, and those on the right had taken cover behind the rail fence leading from the house to the woods, whence they blazed away as earnestly as ever. Yet the guns are out there, and they are what these fellows want, and in the next instant the guns are silent. For a moment, in the confusion and smoke, one might almost suppose that the enemy had them, but in a moment more the guns emerge from the safe side of the smoke cloud, and away they go across the open field to a point near the upper redoubt, where they are again unlimbered and play away again. Further back also go the skirmishers.* And now for a moment the Rebels had the partial cover of the farm and out-buildings, but they saw that they had all their work to do over, and so came on again. Once more they are in the open field, exposed to both artillery and musketry, but this time the distance they have to go is not so great, and they move rapidly. There is thus a another dangerous line of infantry; they are near to us, but we are also near to them. Scarcely a hundred yards were between them and the guns,† when our skirmish line became silent. The lines of the Fifth Wisconsin and the Thirty-third New York formed up in close order to the right of the battery, the long range of musket barrels came level, and one terrible volley tore through the Rebel line. In a moment more the same long range of muskets came to another level, the order to charge with the bayonet was given, and away went the two regiments with one glad cheer. Gallant as our foes undoubtedly were, they could not stand that. But few brigades mentioned in history have done better than that brigade did. For a space, generally estimated at three-quarters of a mile, they had advanced under the fire of a splendidly served battery, and with a cloud of skirmishers stretched across their front, whose fire was very destructive, and if, after that, they had not the nerve to meet a line of bayonets that came towards them like the spirit of destruction incarnate, it need not be wondered at. * * * *

"This was the fight of the day—a fight that was in itself a hard fought and beautiful battle—a battle in which each side must have learned to respect the courage of the other, and which shed glory on all engaged in it. Different statements have been made as to the enemy's force. * * * It is probable that there were two brigades, or part of two. One of them was Early's, and comprised the Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia regiments and a Georgia regiment, and dead were found on the field in the uniform of the Louisiana Tigers. It would probably be safe to state their force at three thousand."‡

*The "skirmishers" here spoken of were evidently the main body itself. See General Hancock's official report of the arrangement of his regiments.—R. L. M.

†The artillery, after retiring, had unlimbered again in rear of the redoubt.—R. L. M.

‡The Twenty-fourth Virginia did not carry as many as six hundred into that charge. The force of the Fifth North Carolina was about the same.—R. L. M.

In General Hancock's official report, it is stated that the retiring regiments abandoned upon the field one of their battle-flags, which his men found and brought in; but this was not the Twenty-fourth's colors; for trusty old Coltraine never lost his grasp upon his precious charge, and having borne it proudly aloft as well in the advance as the retreat, it to-day droops sadly in the library in the capitol at Richmond; faded, tattered and pierced with many a bullet, but pure and unpolluted by touch of hostile hand.

In his first dispatch to Lincoln, General McClellan states that Hancock had repulsed Early's brigade by a real charge with the bayonet, and this statement is again and again repeated, until Mr. Swinton, generally accurate, amplifies upon it thus: "A few of the enemy who approached nearest the fort were bayoneted"—[*Army of the Potomac*, Swinton, page 116]—and he adds a note: "This is official." Rather a doubtful verification, seeing the exceeding great difference in those days between facts and official accounts thereof.

Now, doubtless, by all the laws of war, five regiments and ten guns, drawn in line on ground of their own selection, when attacked by a single regiment in the open and unsupported, instead of giving back and retreating (some by orders and some without), or even "feigning to retreat," as Mr. Swinton says (page 116), should have held their ground, and when the venturesome regiment came up, quietly taken them prisoners—or, perhaps, they might have sallied out and captured it as it advanced. And similarly when this numerous force, abandoning the position they had chosen, and "feigning to retreat," had run into and behind the redoubt they were set to defend, five regiments and ten guns should not have allowed two, with unsupported flanks, to approach them within twenty or thirty yards, and utterly silence their fire, without giving them a taste of cold steel.

But so in fact it was. And in answer to General McClellan and Mr. Swinton and others, the writer hereof, who led the charge of "those who approached nearest the fort"; who himself approached it as near, or nearer, than any other of the assailants, and there remained for several minutes; who being mounted had ample opportunity of seeing all that transpired in front; who entered the field as soon as any of his regiment, and left it later than all save those poor fellows who lay upon the sod, affirms that so far from any bayonet charge having been made upon the Twenty-fourth Virginia, that, as already stated, its advance was steady and uninterrupted from the commencement of the action till it reached the

fence, and was ordered to retire; that during that advance the enemy was driven all the while before it, till they reached their redoubt, and that, in fact, the latter never advanced a foot while this regiment remained upon the field. Any charge made by them, therefore, must have been after the Twenty-fourth had retired; and if, as Mr. Swinton says, any of those who approached nearest the fort were bayoneted, it must have been after they were dead, wounded or prisoners.

The only approach to the use of the bayonet which the writer saw or heard of on that day (and his opportunities for knowing all that occurred there were of the best), was when Private Kirkbride, of Carroll, frantic at the fall of his brother, ran down a Federal officer (a captain of the Fifth Wisconsin), and was about to plunge his bayonet into him. Hearing the earnest call of the officer for quarter, across the field above the din of battle, and seeing that there was no time to spare if the man was to be saved, the writer galloped to where he was, shouting to Kirkbride to hold. The officer begging to surrender, tendered his sword, and unbuckling the belt, with scabbard and pistol, asked that he might be put under guard forthwith; but was told that there was no time to tarry for his pistol, and no men to spare for his guard, and he had better get to the rear; and Kirkbride and his companion hastened on. This occurred but a short time before the fence was reached and the order was given to retire, so that the Federal soon after found himself with his friends again; some of whom (General Hancock himself among them, it is believed) sent the writer soon after, by exchanged prisoners, hearty acknowledgments and thanks for saving their comrade's life.

General McClellan, with his usual exaggeration when counting Confederate soldiers, reported that Hancock had captured two Colonels, two Lieutenant-Colonels, and killed as many more. As a matter of fact, he captured none, and the only field-officer killed was the heroic Budham, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Fifth North Carolina, a very impersonation of courage itself. They claimed to have killed the writer also; but in this, as in many other statements, they were greatly in error.

RICHARD L. MAURY,

Late Colonel Twenty-Fourth Virginia Infantry.

Strength of Ewell's Division in the Campaign of 1862—Field Returns.

LYNCHBURG, May 3, 1880.

DR. JOHN WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary Southern Historical Society* :

SIR—I have recently obtained from one of my staff officers, who had charge of them, a large number of the official papers of Ewell's division, subsequently commanded by me, and among them I find the official returns of the strength of the division at and before the important campaigns and battles of 1862, in which it participated, and as it happens that these returns are not among those in the Confederate archives at Washington, to which Colonel Taylor had access, and from which he has given abstracts in his "Four Year's with General Lee," I send you herewith abstracts from the returns of the division, which will show its strength in the Valley campaign of 1862, at the Seven Days' Battles around Richmond, and in the campaign of August, 1862, against Pope. The returns of Lawton's brigade, when it joined Ewell's division, will give the means of estimating the strength of that brigade in the Seven Days' Battles, about which some persons appear to be under a great misapprehension.

I send also the official report of General Trimble of the operations of his brigade about Manassas, in August, 1862, which happens not to be published among the reports of the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia for 1862; owing to the fact that the report was written and received after my report of the operations of the division had been sent in. It is an interesting report, and constitutes a valuable contribution to the history of the campaign to which it has reference.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. EARLY.

The monthly returns for Ewell's division for the month of April, 1862, made out on the 1st of May, 1862, when the brigades were stationed at Conrad's store and Swift Run gap, in the Valley, show the following officers and men present for duty :

IN ELZEY'S BRIGADE.

Infantry—General and staff officers.....	3
Regimental and company officers.....	58
Quartermasters.....	3
Commissaries.....	1
Surgeons and assistant surgeons.....	4
Enlisted men.....	1,033
Total.....	8 1,094
Artillery—Officers.....	3
Enlisted men.....	84
Total.....	87

IN TRIMBLE'S BRIGADE.

Infantry—General and staff officers.....	4
Regimental and company officers.....	153
Quartermasters.....	5
Commissaries.....	4
Surgeons and assistant surgeons.....	6
Enlisted men.....	2,140
Total.....	15 2,297
Artillery—Officers.....	5
Surgeon.....	1
Enlisted men.....	80
Total.....	1 85

IN TAYLOR'S BRIGADE.

Infantry—Brigade staff (General Taylor and aids absent on leave).....	1
Regimental and company officers.....	124
Quartermasters.....	3
Commissaries.....	4
Surgeons and assistant surgeons.....	7
Enlisted men.....	2,819
Total.....	14 2,944
Artillery—Officers.....	5
Enlisted men.....	73
Total.....	78

Attached to Ewell's command were the Second and Sixth Virginia cavalry, whose strength present for duty was as follows:

SECOND AND SIXTH VIRGINIA CAVALRY.

Regimental and company officers.....	54
Quartermasters	1
Commissaries	2
Surgeons and assistant surgeons.....	4
Enlisted men	841
Total.....	7 895

CONSOLIDATED STRENGTH OF DIVISION FOR DUTY.

Major-General and staff officers.....	4
Division-quartermaster.....	1
Division-commissary.....	1
Division-surgeon.....	1
Infantry—General and staff officers.....	8
Quartermasters.....	9
Commissaries.....	9
Surgeons and assistant surgeons.....	17
Regimental and company officers	335
Enlisted men.....	5,992
Artillery—Surgeon	1
Officers.....	13
Enlisted men.....	237
Total strength of Division.....	38 6,589

Cavalry temporarily attached :

SECOND AND SIXTH VIRGINIA CAVALRY.

Quartermasters.....	1
Commissaries	2
Surgeons and assistant surgeons.....	4
Regimental and company officers.....	54
Enlisted men.....	841
	45 7,484
	45

Entire force carried into the Valley to the assistance of Jackson,
including general and staff officers of all kinds. 7,529

Subsequent returns of Elzey's and Trimble's brigades, of the 10th of May, 1862, about ten days before Ewell's junction with Jackson, show that there was a slight diminution in the effective strength of each of these brigades. There is no return of Taylor's brigade of that date, but the return for May, made on the 1st of June, show a diminution of more than 400 in the effective strength

of that brigade. When the division went to the Valley, Elzey's brigade was composed of the Thirteenth Virginia regiment, the First Maryland regiment, and a battery of artillery.

On the 14th of June, 1862, just four days after the battle of Port Republic, the returns then made show the following number of officers and men present for duty in the infantry :

In Elzey's brigade :

Officers.....	95
Enlisted men	1,049

In Trimble's brigade :

Officers.....	123
Enlisted men	1,049

In Taylor's brigade :

Officers.....	106
Enlisted men	1,793

Aggregate	4,967
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These are the last returns before the movement to join General Lee in the attack on McClellan. The First Maryland regiment had then been detached from Elzey's brigade, and the Twelfth Georgia, Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first Virginia regiments, had been transferred to it. The Forty-fourth, Fifty-second and Fifty-eighth Virginia regiments, all small regiments at that time, were subsequently transferred to the brigade, and constituted a part of it in the battles around Richmond. The artillery attached to the brigades was absent at Mechum's River depot, to replenish ammunition and get new horses.

The returns for the division, made the 10th and 12th of July, 1862, the first full returns after the Seven Days' Battles, show present for duty, in the infantry :

In Elzey's, then Early's brigade (10th July) :

Officers.....	115
Enlisted men	1,444

In Trimble's brigade (12th July) :

Officers.....	100
Enlisted men.....	1,528

In Taylor's brigade (12th July) :

Officers.....	67
Enlisted men.....	1,291

Total.....	4,545
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Elzey's (then Early's) brigade, then consisted of the Twelfth Georgia, and Thirteenth, Twenty-fifth, Thirty-first, Forty-fourth, Fifty-second and Fifty-eighth Virginia regiments, as it had done during the battles.

There was no return for Wheat's battalion, of Taylor's brigade, of that date, but the return for July 20th showed present for duty one officer and one hundred and eleven enlisted men.

The returns for the morning of the 9th of August, 1862, the day of the battle of Cedar Run, show in the division, present for duty :

Infantry—Officers.....	333
Enlisted men.....	4,368
Artillery—Officers.....	10
Enlisted men.....	226
	<hr/>
	4,927

The changes in the organization of the division since the Seven Days' Battles had been the transfer of the Sixteenth Mississippi regiment from Trimble's brigade, the transfer of the Fifth and Fourteenth Louisiana regiments to Taylor's brigade, and the transfer of the Ninth Louisiana from it.

Before the 26th of August, 1862, Lawton's brigade was added to the division, Wheat's battalion of Taylor's brigade was disbanded, and the Forty-ninth Virginia regiment joined Early's brigade, and the returns for that day show in the division, present for duty :

Infantry—Officers.....	467
Enlisted men.....	6,646
Artillery—Officers.....	13
Enlisted men.....	276
	<hr/>
Total.....	7,402

Lawton's brigade was transferred to the division about the 13th of August, and a return of it for that day shows in its six infantry regiments, present for duty :

Officers.....	119
Enlisted men.....	1,922
	<hr/>
Total.....	2,041

And an aggregate present, including extra duty men, sick, &c., of 2,520. Its losses in the Seven Days' Battles amounted to 567.

**General I. R. Trimble's Report of Operations of his Brigade from
14th to 29th of August, 1862.**

CHARLOTTESVILLE, January 20th, 1863.

Brigadier-General J. A. EARLY, *Commanding Ewell's Division*:

General—In compliance with your request, I furnish you a statement of the operation of my (Seventh) brigade from August 14th to August 29th, the day I was wounded.

August 14th—Marched with army from Liberty mills.

August 15th—Bivouacked on march.

August 16th—Encamped at Clark's mountain.

August 17th, 18th and 19th—Encamped at Clark's mountain.

August 20th—Marched from Clark's mountain and bivouacked at Stephensburg.

August 21st—Bivouacked near Rappahannock river.

August 22d—Marched up south side of river, crossed Hazel river at Welford's mill, near which point my brigade was left to guard the wagon train, which being attacked by the enemy who had crossed the Rappanannock, I had an engagement of two hours with a superior force, and drove it across the river with great slaughter. General Hood's brigade coming up, relieved me, but took no part in the action. See my report of this battle to Lieutenant-General Jackson by his order.

August 23d—Marched to near Warrenton Springs.

August 24th—Remained stationary. Heavy artillery engagement with the enemy. In the evening marched to Jefferson and bivouacked.

August 25th—Marched up the river, crossed and halted at Salem—distance, thirty miles.

August 26th—Marched to Bristoe—twenty-seven miles. Trains attacked. At 10 P. M. General Jackson sent me word, if I thought proper, I could attack Manassas Junction that night. Set out to do it with two regiments of near five hundred men in all. Made the attack about 12 M., captured two batteries of four pieces each with all their horses and equipments, over three hundred prisoners, about two hundred negroes, a large number of horses and wagons, a full train of army supplies and 100,000 rations of flour and beef, medical stores, &c., &c., with a loss of but fifteen killed and wounded. See my report to General Jackson by order.

August 27th—My brigade occupied three of the old batteries and redoubts at the Junction. Captain Latimer's battery warmly engaged this day with the enemy, and very effectively dispersing several bodies of the enemy's infantry and cavalry, marched to Centreville unopposed and back to the Junction.

August 28th—Marched with the army to old Manassas battleground, and thence to near Page-land, where, at sunset, the advance columns of General Pope's army were attacked by Jackson's and Ewell's divisions—General A. P. Hill being near Sudley's mills.

My brigade occupied the left wing of our *attacking* force—General Lawton's brigade on my right, General Jackson's division on the extreme right. General Early's brigade, not engaged that night, as the enemy had not advanced to his front, was a fourth of a mile to my left, and somewhat in the rear.

On the order of General Jackson to advance, my brigade moved forward in beautiful order in line of battle, across an open field, soon met the fire of the enemy, and returned it briskly, but not effectively, as the opposing force was under the brow of the plain. It soon grew dark, and the contest was fiercely maintained for an hour by both forces, with severe loss on both sides. About 8 o'clock a charge was ordered, when the Twenty-first Georgia, Major Hooper, and Twenty-first North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, gallantly advanced in the face of a terrific fire of musketry—Colonel Fulton taking his flag and displaying most conspicuous bravery. The fire was the more fatal from the circumstance that the Fifteenth Alabama, being in a skirt of wood, did not advance—not hearing the order. This exposed the two regiments to a front and cross fire from the enemy, who outflanked them, and whose position under the hill enabled them to see the forms of our men against the sky. They rose up when our line was within thirty steps, and delivered a most deadly fire, in which Colonel Fulton was mortally wounded.

The two regiments held their ground most resolutely, until ordered to fall back to the fence, forty steps in the rear, where they continued until evening, retiring across the turnpike, three-fourths of a mile.

The Fifteenth Alabama, in advancing to the front, passed through a skirt of woods and halted at the fence bordering an open field, in which troops were seen. A doubt was expressed whether they were our own or the enemy's—many voices cried out, "Don't fire on our own men"; others said, "They are Yankees." In this un-

certainly, only one company on the left opened its fire, and continued it doubtfully at intervals. Unfortunately, Captain Feagan, who was on the right, believed them to be our men, and took no prompt means to discover their character, and thus lost the opportunity of delivering a destructive fire upon them.

The Twelfth Georgia advanced to the fence, opened fire rapidly against a force in front, receiving a galling fire in return, and held their ground until the close of the action. Neither the Twelfth Georgia nor Fifteenth Alabama heard the command to charge.

The left of the brigade was exposed during the whole action to the rapid discharge of a small piece of ordinance, or 6-pounder lightly charged, throwing balls and slugs and case shot, which, if well aimed, would have swept our men from the field—but the hail of projectiles passed mostly above us, like blasts of a hurricane.

I cannot refrain from the remark, that I have never known so terrible a fire as raged for over an hour on both sides. The dead and wounded bore next morning melancholy evidence of its severity. The Twenty-first Georgia had that afternoon called the rolls in my presence, and found *two hundred and forty-two* men in ranks; the next day, at noon, but sixty-nine men could be found for duty. The same fearful proportion was lost by the Twenty-first North Carolina. But three captains in both regiments escaped death or wounds. In this action General Ewell was wounded.

I cannot omit to mention here the truly gallant and heroic bearing of Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton in this as in former engagements. He fell in the desperate charge mortally wounded, and died the same night, requesting in his last moments that the Confederate flag he had himself borne should be displayed before his failing sight.

The Confederate States army had no braver officer or kinder hearted gentleman. His State should cherish his memory, and tell her sons in all time to emulate his patriotic virtues.

The Twenty-first Georgia and Twenty-first North Carolina regiments, or the shattered fragments left unhurt, were left next day to bury their dead.

August 29th—I took the Fifteenth Alabama and Twelfth Georgia into the action on Friday at 10 o'clock, and by order of General Lawton posted them on his left. I selected the line of the railroad excavation and embankment, a good position, as the events of that and the next day proved, and awaited the advance of the enemy,

who, largely reinforced, seemed resolved to exterminate Jackson's corps before General Longstreet should come up. Desperate fighting had begun in the woods on my left on the line of the railroad. Our skirmishers had been driven in, and every moment I expected a heavy force of the enemy to be hurled against our small body, not three hundred in all, but men resolved to fight to the last.

As the attack was delayed, and I feared the enemy intended, by a circuit, to outflank us through the wood between General Lawton and myself, I rode rapidly to the top of the hill, having no staff officer near me, to observe the direction in which they were advancing, when an explosive ball from the advance skirmishers shattered my leg. With great pain I kept my horse, rode back, and was carried from the field.

I presume a list of killed and wounded on the 28th, 29th and 30th has been officially handed in by my successor, and is herewith inclosed.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. R. TRIMBLE, *Brigadier-General.*

NOTE.—The Twelfth Georgia regiment was transferred from Early's brigade to Trimble's brigade on the 27th of August, 1862.

J. A. E.

Battle of Gettysburg.*Report of General S. D. Ramseur.*

HEADQUARTERS RAMSEUR'S BRIGADE,
July 30, 1863.

Major G. PEYTON, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

In accordance with orders from division headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the actions of the 1st, 2d and 3d of July, 1863, near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania:

July 1st.—In rear of the division train, as a guard on the march from Heidlersburg to Gettysburg, my brigade arrived on the field after the division had formed line of battle. I was then held in reserve to support General Doles on the left, Colonel O'Neal left centre, or General Iverson on the right centre, according to circumstances. After resting about fifteen minutes, I received orders to send two regiments to the support of Colonel O'Neal, and with the remaining two to support Iverson. I immediately detached the Second and Fourth North Carolina sharpshooters to support O'Neal, and with the Fourteenth and Thirtieth hastened to the support of Iverson. I found three regiments of Iverson's command almost annihilated, and the Third Alabama regiment coming out of the fight from Iverson's right. I requested Colonel Battle, Third Alabama, to join me, which he cheerfully did, with these regiments—Third Alabama, Fourteenth and Thirtieth North Carolina—I turned the enemy's strong position in a body of woods, surrounded by a stone fence, by attacking in mass on his right flank, driving him back and getting in his rear. At the time of my advance on the enemy's right, I sent to the commanding officer of the Twelfth North Carolina, of Iverson's brigade, to push the enemy in front. This was done. The enemy, seeing his right flank turned, made but feeble resistance to the front attack, but ran off the field in confusion, leaving his killed and wounded, and between 800 and 900 prisoners in our hands.

The enemy was pushed through Gettysburg to the heights beyond, when I received an order to halt and form line of battle in a street in Gettysburg running east and west.

To Colonel Parker, Thirtieth North Carolina; Colonel Bennett, Nineteenth North Carolina; Colonel Grimes, Fourth North Carolina, and Major Hurt, Second North Carolina, my thanks are due for

the skill and gallantry displayed by them in this day's fight. Lieutenant Harvey, Fourteenth North Carolina sharpshooters, commanding sharpshooters, deserves especial praise for his daring conduct. He whipped a Yankee regiment (150th Pennsylvania) with his sharpshooters, and took their regimental colors from them with his own hands. Colonel Battle, with the Third Alabama, rendered brilliant and invaluable service; attaching his regiment to my command, on his own responsibility, he came in at the right place, at the right time, and in the right way.

July 2d—Remained in line of battle all day, with very heavy skirmishing in front. At dark I received an order from Major-General Rodes to move by the right flank until Brigadier-General Doles' troops cleared the town, and then to advance in line of battle on the enemy's *position* on the Cemetery hill; was told that the remaining brigades of the division would be governed by my movements. Obeying this order, until within two hundred yards of the enemy's position, where batteries were discovered in position to pour upon our lines direct cross and enfilade fires. Two lines of infantry behind stone walls and breastworks were supporting these batteries. The strength and position of the enemy's batteries and their supports, induced me to halt to confer with General Doles, and with him to make representation of the character of the enemy's position, and ask further instructions. In answer, received an order to retire quietly to a deep road, some three hundred yards in rear, and be in readiness to attack at daylight; withdrew accordingly.

July 3d—Remained in line all day, with severe and damaging skirmishing in front. Exposed to the artillery of the enemy and our own short range guns, by the careless use or imperfect ammunition, by which I lost seven (7) men killed and wounded. Withdrew at night and formed line of battle near Gettysburg, where we remained on the 4th of July. Commenced retreat with the army on the night of the 4th instant.

I desire to express my thanks to the gentlemen of my staff, Captain Gales, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant Richmond, Aid-de-Camp; and Lieutenant Morrison, volunteer aid, for gallant and efficient services. My casualties are as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners.	Total.
Second Regiment.....	4	27	1	32
Fourth Regiment.....	8	24	24	56
Fourteenth Regiment.....	5	37	2	44
Thirtieth Regiment.....	6	34	5	45
	23	112	32	177

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. D. RAMSEUR, *Brigadier-General.*

General Davis' Report of Operations of Heth's Division.

HEADQUARTERS DAVIS' BRIGADE,
August 22, 1863.

Major WILLIAM H. PALMER, *Assistant Adjutant-General:*

Major—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of Major-General Heth's division in the battle of the 3d of July at Gettysburg. On the evening of the 2d, this division, under command of Brigadier-General J. J. Pettigrew (Major-General Heth having been wounded in the engagement of the 1st), moved to the front and was formed in line of battle, with Archer's brigade on the right, commanded by D. B. Fry (Brigadier-General Archer having been wounded and captured on the 1st of July); Colonel Brockenbrough's brigade on the left; Pettigrew's, commanded by Colonel James K. Marshall, of the Fifty-second North Carolina, on the right centre, and Davis' on the left centre, immediately in the rear of our artillery, which was in position on the crest of a high ridge running nearly parallel to the enemy's line, which was on a similar elevation and near one mile distant—the intervening space, except the crests of the hills, being fields intersected by strong post and rail fences. In this position we bivouacked for the night.

Early on the morning of the 3d, the enemy threw some shells at the artillery in our front, from which a few casualties occurred

in one of the brigades. About 9 A. M. the division was moved to the left about a quarter of a mile, and in the same order of battle was formed in the rear of Major Pegram's battalion of artillery, which was posted on the crest of a high hill, the ground between us and the enemy being like that of our first position. About 1 P. M. the artillery along our entire line opened on the enemy, and was promptly replied to; for two hours the fire was heavy and incessant. Being immediately in the rear of our batteries, and having had no time to prepare means of protection, we suffered some losses—in Davis' brigade two men were killed and twenty-one wounded. The order had been given that when the artillery in our front ceased firing, the division should attack the enemy's batteries, keeping dressed to the right and moving in line with Major-General Pickett's division, which was on our right, and marched obliquely to the left. The artillery ceased firing at 3 o'clock, and the order to move forward was given and promptly obeyed. The division moved off in line, and, passing the wooded crest of the hill, descended to the open fields that lay between us and the enemy. Not a gun was fired at us until we reached a strong post and rail fence, about three-fourths of a mile from the enemy's position, when we were met by a heavy fire of grape, canister and shell, which told sadly upon our ranks. Under this destructive fire, which commanded our front and left with fatal effect, the troops displayed great coolness, were well in hand and moved steadily forward, regularly closing up the gaps made in their ranks. Our advance across the field was interrupted by other fences of a similar character, in crossing which the alignment became more or less deranged. This was in each case promptly rectified, and though its ranks were growing thinner at every step, this division moved steadily on in line with the troops on the right. When within musket range we encountered a heavy fire of small arms, from which we suffered severely; but this did not for a moment check the advance. The right of the division, owing to the conformation of the ridge in which the enemy was posted, having a shorter distance to pass over to reach his first line of defence, encountered him first in close conflict, but the whole division dashed up to his first line of defence, a stone wall, behind which the opposing infantry was strongly posted. Here we were subjected to a most galling fire of musketry and artillery, that so reduced the already thinned ranks that any further effort to carry the position was hopeless, and there was nothing left but to retire.

to the position originally held, which was done in more or less confusion. The division reached the line held in the morning about 4 P. M., and remained there thirty hours expecting an attack from the enemy. No demonstration was made on any part of our line during that or the following day, on the night of which we began our retreat to Hagerstown. In the assault upon the enemy's position, the coolness and courage of men and officers is worthy high commendation, and I regret that the names of the gallant men who fell distinguished in that bloody field have not been more fully reported. In this assault we are called upon to mourn the loss of many brave men and officers. Colonel D. B. Fry, Thirteenth Alabama, commanding Archer's brigade, and Colonel James K. Marshall, of the Fifty-second North Carolina, commanding Pettigrew's, were wounded and taken prisoners whilst gallantly leading their brigades. The number killed and wounded was very great, and in officers unusually so, as may be seen from the fact that in Archer's brigade but two field officers escaped; in Pettigrew's but one, and in Davis' all were killed or wounded. Brigadier-General Pettigrew had his horse killed and received a slight wound in the hand. Not having commanded the division in this engagement, and having been exclusively occupied by the operations of my own brigade, this report is necessarily imperfect, and I regret that I am unable to do full justice to the division.

I am, Major, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH R. DAVIS, *Brigadier-General.*

Report of Brigadier-General A. R. Wright.

CAMP NEAR ORANGE COURTHOUSE,
September 28th, 1863.

Major THOMAS S. MILLS, A. A. G., *Anderson's Division :*

Major—I submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the military operations at Gettysburg on the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th of July last.

On the morning of the 1st of July, I moved my brigade from its camp near Fayetteville, Pennsylvania, and by order of the Major-General commanding the division, marched in the direction of Gettysburg, passing through the South mountain at Cashtown gap. In this march my brigade was immediately in rear of Ma-

hone's brigade, and I was instructed to follow Mahone's command. About 10 o'clock A. M., and when within about one mile of Cashtown (which is at the foot of the eastern slope of South mountain), my command was stopped by the halt of Mahone's brigade in the road, in my immediate front. In a few minutes after I had halted, the report of artillery was heard in the direction of Gettysburg, and seemingly not more than six or eight miles distant.

After remaining about an hour or hour and a half in the road, the column again moved forward, my brigade following Mahone's as before. On arriving near Cashtown, I was directed to file off to the right of the turnpike and bivouac my men in a piece of timbered land in the rear of Mahone, who had preceded me in the woods. At the same time I was informed that my wagon train would be parked in the open field in my front. In this position I remained until about 1 P. M., when we again took up the line of march along the turnpike in the direction of Gettysburg.

When within about six miles of the latter place, I was compelled by severe indisposition to leave my command, and consequently know nothing more of the day's operations, except that derived from Colonel Gibson, of the Forty-eighth Georgia regiment, who, in my absence, assumed command of the brigade. By him I was informed that between 4 and 5 o'clock P. M., the brigade reached a position three-quarters of a mile to the right of the turnpike, and about two and a half or three miles from Gettysburg, where they remained until the next morning, when I found them in line of battle at 7 A. M., on returning to the command July 2d. Just after assuming command, I received orders to move my brigade by the right flank, following immediately in rear of Perry's brigade. In this order, I was conducted by Major-General Anderson to a position already occupied by the troops of the Third corps, and was directed to relieve a brigade (Davis', I think, of Heth's division) then in line of battle, about two miles south of Gettysburg. About noon, I was informed by Major-General Anderson that an attack upon the enemy's lines would soon be made by the whole division, commencing on our right, by Wilcox's brigade, and that each brigade of the division would begin the attack as soon as the brigade on its right commenced the movement. I was instructed to move simultaneously with Perry's brigade, which was on my right, and informed that Posey's brigade, on my left, would move forward upon my advance. This being the order of battle, I awaited the signal for the general advance, which, at about 5 P. M.,

was given by the advance of Wilcox's and Perry's brigades on my right. I immediately ordered forward my brigade, and attacked the enemy in his strong position on a range of hills running south from the town of Gettysburg. In this advance, I was compelled to pass for more than a mile across an open plain, intersected by numerous post and rail fences, and swept by the enemy's artillery, which was posted along the Emmettsburg road, and upon the crest of the height on McPherson's farm, a little south of Cemetery hill. In this advance, my brigade was formed in the following order: The Twenty-second Georgia regiment on the right, the Third Georgia in the centre, and the Forty-eighth Georgia on the left. The Second Georgia battalion, which was deployed in front of the whole brigade as skirmishers, was directed to close intervals on the left as soon as the command reached the line of skirmishers, and form upon the left of the brigade. Owing to the impetuosity of the advance, and the length of the line occupied by them, the Second battalion failed to form all its companies upon the left of the brigade—some of them falling into line with other regiments of the command. My men moved steadily forward until reaching within musket range of the Emmettsburg turnpike, when we encountered a strong body of infantry posted under cover of a fence, near to and parallel with the road. Just in the rear of this line of infantry were the advanced batteries of the enemy, posted along the Emmettsburg turnpike, with a field of fire raking the whole valley below.

Just before reaching this position, I had observed that Posey's brigade on my left had not advanced, and fearing that if I proceeded much further, with my left flank entirely unprotected, I might become involved in serious difficulties, I despatched my Aid-de-Camp, Captain R. H. Bell, with a message to Major-General Anderson, informing him of my own advance, and its extent, and that General Posey had not advanced with his brigade on my left.

To this message, I received a reply, to "press on; that Posey had been ordered in on my left, and that he (General Anderson) would reiterate the order." I immediately charged upon the enemy's line, and drove him in great confusion upon his second line, which was formed behind a stone fence, some hundred or more yards in rear of the Emmettsburg turnpike. At this point we captured several pieces of artillery, which the enemy, in his haste and confusion, was unable to take off the field. Having gained the Emmettsburg turnpike, we again charged upon the

enemy, heavily posted behind a stone fence which ran along the abrupt slope of the height, some one hundred and fifty yards in rear of the pike. Here the enemy made considerable resistance to our further progress, but was finally forced to retire by the impetuous charge of my command. We were now within less than a hundred yards of the crest of the height, which was lined with artillery, supported by a strong body of infantry, under protection of a stone fence. My men, by a well directed fire, soon drove the cannoniers from their guns, and leaping over the fence charged up to the top of the crest and drove the enemy's infantry into a rocky gorge on the eastern slope of the height, and some eighty or a hundred yards in rear of the enemy's batteries. We were now complete masters of the field, having gained the key, as it were, to the enemy's whole line. Unfortunately, just as we had carried the enemy's last and strongest position, it was discovered that the brigade on our right had not only not advanced across the turnpike, but had actually given way, and was rapidly falling back to the rear, while on our left we were entirely unprotected—the brigade ordered to our support having failed to advance.

It was now evident, with my ranks so seriously thinned as they had been by this terrible charge, I should not be able to hold my position unless speedily and strongly reinforced. My advanced position, and the unprotected condition of my flanks, invited an attack, which the enemy were speedy to discover, and immediately passed a strong body of infantry (under cover of a high ledge of rocks, thickly covered with stunted undergrowth), which fell away from the gorge, in rear of their batteries before mentioned, in a southeasterly direction, and emerging on the western slope of the ridge, came upon my right and rear at a point equidistant from the Emmettsburg turnpike and the stone fence, while a large brigade advanced from the point of woods on my left, which extended nearly down to the turnpike, and gaining the turnpike, moved rapidly to meet the party which had passed around upon our right. We were now in a critical condition. The enemy's converging line was rapidly closing upon our rear—a few moments more and we would be completely surrounded—still no support could be seen coming to our assistance, and with painful hearts we abandoned our captured guns, faced about, and prepared to cut our way through the closing lines in our rear. This was effected in tolerable order, but with immense loss. The enemy rushed to his abandoned guns as soon as we began to retire, and poured a severe

fire of grape and cannister into our thinned ranks as we retired slowly down the slope into the valley below. I continued to fall back, until reaching a slight depression a few hundred yards in advance of our skirmish line in the morning, when I halted, reformed my brigade, and awaited the further pursuit of the enemy. Finding the enemy not disposed to continue his advance, a line of skirmishers was thrown out in my front, and a little after dark my command moved to the position which we had occupied before the attack was made.

In this charge my loss was very severe, amounting to six hundred and eighty-eight in killed, wounded and missing—including many valuable officers.

I have not the slightest doubt but that I should have been able to maintain my position on the height, and secured the captured artillery, if there had been a protecting force on my left, or if the brigade on my right had not been forced to retire.

We captured over twenty pieces of artillery, all of which we were compelled to abandon. These pieces were taken by the respective regiments composing the brigade, as follows: The Third Georgia, eleven pieces; Twenty-second Georgia, three pieces; Forty-eighth Georgia, four pieces; and the Second battalion several pieces, the exact number not ascertained, but believed to amount to as many as five or six pieces. I am gratified to say that all the officers and men behaved in the most handsome manner—indeed, I have never seen their conduct excelled on any battlefield in this war.

In the list of casualties, I am pained to find the name of Colonel Joseph Warden, commanding the Twenty-second Georgia regiment, who was killed at the head of his command near the Emmetsburg turnpike. The service contained no better or truer officer, and his death, while deeply deplored by his friends and associates, will be a serious loss to the Confederacy.

Major George W. Ross, commanding Second Georgia battalion, was seriously wounded, fell into the hands of the enemy, and has since died. This gallant officer was shot down while in the enemy's works, on the crest of the heights, endeavoring to have some of the captured artillery removed. As a disciplinarian he had no superior in the field. An accomplished gentleman and gallant officer, the country will mourn his loss.

Colonel William Gibson, commanding Forty-eighth Georgia

regiment, was seriously wounded, and left upon the field. I am pleased to say that recent information received, gives assurance of his ultimate recovery. This regiment suffered more severely than any other in the command; being on the extreme left, it was exposed to a heavy enfilade, as well as direct fire; the colors were shot down no less than seven times, and were finally taken.

During the morning of Friday, 3d, my brigade remained quietly in its original line of battle. Late in the afternoon it was moved forward five or six hundred yards, to cover the retreat of Pickett's division, which had assaulted the enemy's position at the same point where my brigade had advanced the day before, and had been forced to retire. Soon after I was ordered by General Lee to move my brigade to the right, several hundred yards, and form in rear of Wilcox's brigade, to support the latter in case the enemy should advance upon it, which was now threatened. In this position I remained until after nightfall, when I retired to my original position, in line of battle, upon the hill. On Saturday, the 4th, my command remained quietly in line until about sunset, when I was ordered to take up the line of march for Fairfield. We reached the latter place about midnight, marching through drenching rain, and then I received orders to move on to Monterey gap, in South mountain, and support Iverson's brigade, which had been attacked in the mountain while guarding a large wagon train. About daylight I came upon the rear of the train, on the top of the mountain, but found the road so completely blocked up as to prevent my further progress. I halted my command and permitted my men to lie down and take a little rest, while I rode to the front to ascertain the exact condition of affairs.

I found General Iverson near Monterey, and not far from the Waynesboro' turnpike, and from him learned that all danger to the train had passed. I directed him to move on in the direction of Waynesboro' as rapidly as possible, so as to enable our troops to get through the mountain pass.

Shortly after this, Major-General Anderson came up and assumed the further direction of the day. From this time until we recrossed the Potomac my brigade lost not a single man. In the very severe and fatiguing march of the night before recrossing the river my entire command displayed a patient endurance of physical suffering and heroic fortitude rarely exhibited by any troops. A detailed list of the casualties of my brigade was forwarded to you immediately after the battle, and is therefore omitted in this report.

Enclosed I hand you copies of the reports of officers commanding the different regiments composing this brigade.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. R. WRIGHT,
Brigadier-General Commanding Brigade.

Report of Brigadier-General Joseph R. Davis.

HEADQUARTERS DAVIS' BRIGADE, August 26th, 1863.

Major R. H. FINNEY, *Assistant Adjutant-General:*

Major—I have the honor to submit the following report to you of the part taken by my brigade in the battle of the 1st of July, 1863, at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

Early on the morning of the 1st I moved in rear of Archer's brigade, with three regiments of my command (the Eleventh Mississippi being left as a guard for the division wagon train) from camp on the heights near Cashtown, by a turnpike road leading to Gettysburg. When within about two miles from town our artillery was put in position and opened fire. I was ordered to take position on the left of the turnpike, and, with the right resting on it, press forward towards the town. About 10.30 A. M. a line of battle was formed, with the Forty-second Mississippi, Colonel H. R. Miller commanding, on the right; Fifty-fifth North Carolina, Colonel J. R. Connally commanding, on the left, and Second Mississippi, Colonel J. M. Stone commanding, in the centre. Skirmishers were thrown forward and the brigade moved forward to the attack.

Between us and the town, and very near it, was a commanding hill in wood—the intervening space being inclosed fields of grass and grain, and was very broken. On our right was the turnpike and a railroad, with deep cuts and heavy embankments, diverging from the turnpike as it approached the town. On the high hill the enemy had artillery, with infantry supports. The line of skirmishers advanced, and the brigade moved forward about one mile, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and came within range of his line of battle, which was drawn up on a high hill in a field a short distance in front of a railroad cut. The engagement soon became very warm. After a short contest, the order was given to

charge, and promptly obeyed. The enemy made a stubborn resistance and stood until our men were within a few yards, and then gave way and fled in much confusion, but rallied near the railroad, where he again made a stand, and after desperate fighting, with heavy loss on both sides, he fled in great disorder towards the town, leaving us in possession of his commanding position and batteries. After a short interval he again returned in greater numbers, and the fight was renewed. Being opposed by greatly superior numbers, our men gave way under the first shock of his attack, many officers and men having been killed or wounded, and all much exhausted by the excessive heat; but the line was promptly formed, and carried to its former position, and whilst there engaged, a heavy force was observed moving rapidly towards the right, and soon after opened a heavy fire on our right flank and rear. In this critical condition, I gave the order to retire—which was done in good order, leaving some officers and men in the railroad cut, who were captured, although every effort was made to withdraw all the command. This was about 1 P. M. About 3 P. M. a division of Lieutenant-General Ewell's corps came up on our left, moving in line perpendicular to ours, and the brigade was again moved forward, and, after considerable fighting, reached the suburbs of the town, into which the enemy had been driven. The men, being much exhausted by the heat and severity of the engagement, were here rested, and about sunset were ordered to bivouac about a mile to the rear. In this day's engagement, the losses in men and officers were very heavy. Of nine field officers present, but two escaped unhurt. Colonel Stone, of the Second Mississippi, and Colonel Conally, of the Fifty-fifth North Carolina, were both wounded while gallantly leading their men in the first charge. Lieutenant-Colonel M. T. Smith, of the Fifty-fifth North Carolina—a gallant and efficient officer—was mortally wounded. Major Belo, of the same, was severely wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Mosely and Major Feenay, of the Forty-second Mississippi, were both severely wounded. A large number of the company officers were killed or wounded. It is due to the gallantry of a few brave men to state that a part of the Second and Forty-second Mississippi (under the lead of Lieutenant Roberts, of the Second Mississippi), dashed forward and after a hand to hand contest, in which the gallant Roberts was killed, succeeded in capturing the colors of a Pennsylvania regiment. A number of

prisoners were captured—the Forty-second Mississippi taking one hundred and fifty, and other regiments perhaps as many or more.

I am indebted to the members of my staff for the prompt and efficient manner in which they discharged their duties. My Aid-de-Camp, Lieutenant Estes, and Captain Lowry had their horses killed. Captain W. T. Magruder and Lieutenant T. C. Holliday, and Cadet James D. Reid were all in action and rendered valuable service.

I am, Major, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH R. DAVIS,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

Report of Brigadier-General C. Posey.

HEADQUARTER'S POSEY'S BRIGADE,
July 29, 1863.

Major MILLS, *Assistant-Adjutant General* :

Major—On the morning of July 2d, my brigade was placed in position before Gettysburg in the rear of Major Pegram's battery of artillery, in an open field, with woods on my right and left flanks. My position was to the right of the cemetery, about which the enemy's lines of battle were formed. In the afternoon I received an order to advance after Brigadier-General Wright, who was posted on my right in a woods. Before the advance was made, I received an order from the Major-General, through his Aid-de-Camp, Captain Shannon, to advance but two of my regiments, and deploy them closely as skirmishers. I had then a thin line of skirmishers in front, and at once sent out the Forty-eighth and Nineteenth regiments, Colonel Jane and Colonel Harris commanding. These regiments advanced some two or three hundred yards beyond the barn and house, which were burned. Later in the day I sent out the Sixteenth, and receiving information that the enemy was threatening their right and left flanks, I took out the Twelfth regiment, and requested Brigadier-General Mahone, who was on my left, in the rear of another division, to send me a regiment to support my left. He being at this time ordered to the right, could not comply. When I reached the barn, I found my regiments (three) well up in advance—they had driven the enemy's pickets in their works, and the artillerists from their guns in their front. It being then nearly dark, I sent the Major-General a message, in-

forming him of my position. He then ordered me to fall back to my original position in the rear of Pegram's battery. On the 3d, my brigade was held in reserve to support the battery in my front. The list of casualties has already been sent in to you.

Very respectfully,

C. POSEY, *Brigadier-General.*

Report of Brigadier-General Edward L. Thomas.

HEADQUARTERS' THOMAS' BRIGADE,
August 12, 1863.

Major J. A. ENGELHARD, *Assistant-Adjutant General:*

Major—I reply to circular of August 12, 1863. I have the honor to report that this brigade, on July 1st, was, by order of Major-General Pender, formed in line of battle on the left of the road leading to Gettysburg. In this order it advanced to within about one mile of Gettysburg, in readiness to support Major-General Heth's division. From this position the brigade moved still farther to the front, and took a position assigned to it by Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill. Here we remained until near sunset, when, by General Pender's order, we took position near Gettysburg—on the right of the town—in support of artillery. This position was occupied until the night of July 2d, when, with General McGowan's brigade, it was directed to take position in the open field, about three hundred yards in front of the enemy's line, on the right of General Ewell's corps. Here we remained until the night of July 3d, when we were ordered to take position in the woods on the right of Gettysburg, near the town, from which place, on the night of July 4th, the march was commenced to Hagerstown, Maryland. The brigade lost many valuable men and officers in heavy skirmishing with the enemy. The conduct of men and officers throughout the campaign was highly commendable.

With highest respect, your obedient servant,

EDWARD L. THOMAS, *Brigadier-General.*

Report of Brigadier-General William Mahone.

HEADQUARTERS' MAHONE'S BRIGADE, ANDERSON'S DIVISION,
July 10, 1863.

Major T. T. MILLS, *Assistant Adjutant-General* :

Major—The operations of this brigade in the battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, may be summed up in a few brief remarks. The brigade took no special or active part in the actions of that battle beyond that which fell to the lot of its line of skirmishers. During the days and nights of 2d and 3d of July, the brigade was posted in line of battle immediately in front of the enemy, and in support of Pegram's batteries. In this front its skirmishers were quite constantly engaged, and inflicted much loss upon the enemy; and after the repulse of our troops on the 3d, maintained firmly its line. During the 2d and 3d the brigade was exposed to a large share of the terrific shelling of those days, and from which its loss was mainly sustained. Casualties in the battle—killed, eight men; wounded, two officers and fifty-three men; missing, thirty-nine men. Total, one hundred and two.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM MAHONE, *Brigadier-General.*

Defence of Vicksburg in 1862—The Battle of Baton Rouge.

By Major JOHN B. PIRTLE.

[The Louisville Branch of the Southern Historical Society has been sustained with a good deal of spirit and interest. They hold regular meetings, and have had read before them a number of papers which deserve to be put in permanent form, and which the president, Major W. O. Dod, and the secretary, Major E. H. McDonald, have promised to send us. Our readers will thank us for giving this week the interesting and valuable paper read before the society by Major John B. Pirtle.]

The Army of Tennessee, under General Bragg, had been for several weeks encamped at and near Tupelo, Mississippi, and here on the night of the 18th of June, 1862, the reserve corps, as Breckinridge's division was called (this designation had been given it when the dispositions for the battle of Shiloh were made), received orders to be prepared to march at daylight the next morning.

Memphis was now in the possession of the enemy, and a heavy column of infantry and cavalry was menacing our railroad lines at Oxford and Grenada, where we had large quantities of army supplies. To protect these points, Breckinridge's division was detached from the army and marched across the country to the railroad near Abbeville, reaching there on the 22d of June. The enemy did not advance, as was expected, but returned to Memphis, and, after removing the supplies from Grenada, in obedience to orders from the Commanding-General, the division proceeded by railroad to Vicksburg, part of the command reaching there on the 29th, and the remainder on the 30th of June. In order that you may understand the situation at Vicksburg at this time, it will be necessary for me to digress a little.

After the capture of New Orleans, Major-General Lovel, who had been in command there, determined to make a defence at Vicksburg, and the patriotic people of that devoted city approved his determination, although they knew it might cause its destruction. Brigadier-General M. L. Smith, with a force of some 2,000 men, occupied the city, and proceeded to erect batteries for heavy guns on the bluffs which overlooked the river. Water batteries were also constructed and heavy guns put in position. The city was in a measure ready for defence before the enemy's fleet of gunboats, mortars and transports from New Orleans arrived below it.

When Breckinridge's command reached Vicksburg, the fleet was in sight below the city, and in a few days the upper fleet from Vicksburg arrived. The Federals now had above and below the city more than forty gunboats, mortar-boats, rams and transports, besides an army. On the 2d of July the bombardment begun, and for over three weeks it was kept up without much intermission. Our troops were placed in convenient positions to support the batteries, and proper dispositions were made to promptly repel any attack that might be made by a land force. Some of you who are present will remember the disagreeable nights spent in the railroad cut, the picket duty on the river front, and the march to Big bayou, on the Warrenton road, to meet an enemy "who was not," the "Castle," and the "Smede House." You will remember, too, that because of the necessary exposure to which the troops were subjected, malarial disease abounded, filling the hospitals with fevered patients, so that in less than three weeks from the 30th of June nearly one-half of the defenders of Vicksburg were on the sick list. At the commencement of the bombardment many families were living at their homes in the city, and it is true that quite a

number remained throughout the siege. Although, when the enemy withdrew, hardly a house remained which had not been struck. There were very few casualties, as even thus early the people had dug caves in the sides of the hills; and, when the regular morning and afternoon shelling begun, they gathered their little ones in and remained in safety until there was a cessation. Often, on returning to their homes, they would find a ruthless enemy had been there. Perhaps it was the mother's room which the unfriendly shell, two feet long and a foot in diameter, had entered and destroyed, leaving nothing fit for further use, except the woodwork, which might do for kindling. I know of an instance, during one of the night bombardments, in which a large solid shot entered a room in which two children were sleeping, and, after passing through the bureau, struck the bed, tore out the foot-posts and passed out of the house. The bed was dropped to the floor, but the children, though much frightened, were unharmed. On one occasion, soon after the investment, a regiment which had been on picket duty along the river front, on being withdrawn, was marched along the road on the bluff down to the centre of the city and out the Jackson road to its camp. The movement was in full view of the enemy, and provoked a terrific fire. At first the range was bad, but before the regiment had got out of their reach the shells burst above and around it in a manner very unpleasant. Two men were struck by pieces of shell, one being killed. No more regiments were moved by daylight along that bluff. The spectacle during the night bombardments was grand. Such displays of pyrotechnics have rarely been seen. The graceful ascent of the bomb making its curve just before it reached the city, that it might explode over it; shells bursting here, there, everywhere; the lurid light of the mortar as the bomb was shot upward; the hisses and shrieks most unearthly of the "buggy wheels," as the men called the long, conical shells, the noise of the batteries, the earth trembling, made impressions never to be effaced from the memory of those who were at Vicksburg during the summer of 1862. When at last the enemy, apparently tired out, would cease firing, the silence would seem strange.

The Yazoo river empties itself into the Mississippi at a point about twelve miles, I think, above Vicksburg. Up the Yazoo, on the approach of the fleet, had been run several steamboats and other crafts, which were protected by a ram called the *Arkansas*. General Van Dorn, the Commanding-General at Vicksburg, believed this ironclad to be formidable enough to successfully attack the

whole upper fleet of the enemy, and he thought that if she could fight her way through that fleet and reach Vicksburg uninjured, it would demonstrate to the enemy the impossibility of their taking the city, for they then would be put on the defensive. He determined to make the venture, and Captain Brown, her commander, was ordered to bring her out into the Mississippi, and after sinking a boat in the Yazoo to prevent the enemy reaching our steamboats, let her drive right through the upper fleet. How well Captain Brown obeyed his instructions you all know. On the morning of the 15th of July, the cannoneers at the Vicksburg batteries discovered a commotion in the fleet above, and rapid firing was heard. There was a scattering of the groups of war vessels and transports, and soon from the midst of them, firing broadsides from all her port-holes, came riding down a queer-looking craft flying the Confederate flag. It was the *Arkansas*. She had run the gauntlet of the upper fleet, dealing death and destruction as she came. She had proved her offensive power, for she had inflicted much damage. A right royal welcome did she receive as she rounded to at the wharf, and right nobly had she earned it. Her injuries were slight, and soon repaired. Her casualties, if my memory serves correctly, were but seven—two killed and five wounded. Among her crew was a young man from this city named Gilmore. He had formerly been an officer in the First Kentucky infantry, a one-year regiment, which had been mustered out when its term of service expired. From the Kentucky brigades volunteers were accepted to fill the places of those who had been killed and wounded. About a week after this event, just about sunrise, the *Essex*, a formidable Federal ironclad, bore down on the *Arkansas*, but after a short fight withdrew. The evident intention was to fasten on to the *Arkansas* with grappling irons and then board her with a superior force, but the attempt failed, and the *Essex* lost a number of her crew killed. The enemy, now apparently satisfied that Vicksburg was impregnable to his attack, seemed determined to destroy the city at any rate. The bombardment was more furious than ever for a few days, and then gradually ceased, and on the 27th of July the fleets which for nearly a month had day and night rained an iron hail upon the city, acknowledged defeat and steamed away. Not a gun in the batteries had been dismounted, and we had lost but twenty-two men killed and wounded. The successful defence of Vicksburg had been accomplished. Hardly had the enemy disappeared, when orders were issued to Breckinridge's command to break up camp and proceed to the railroad and take the cars for Camp Moore. It

was rumored that a heavy force of the enemy from Baton Rouge was threatening that point, but the rumor proved unfounded. Camp Moore was on the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, near the little town of Tangipahoa, some seventy or eighty miles above New Orleans. It was the place where the Louisiana regiments were organized, equipped and drilled at the beginning of the war. Breckinridge's command arrived at Camp Moore late in the afternoon of the 28th of July, and on the morning of the 30th it was put in motion toward Baton Rouge. At Camp Moore, Brigadier-General Daniel Ruggles with a small force joined us, and we numbered now about 4,000 men all told. The weather was intensely hot, and about one-third of the men were without shoes. Many had no coats. No baggage was allowed; each man carried his all on his back, and some were almost naked. Water along the line of march was very scarce; often it was ten to fifteen miles from one running stream to another, and no other water to be had. Sometimes we passed stagnant water, ponds on which the green scum lay thick. I saw many men drive off the scum with their hands and greedily drink that water. The fierce heat of the sun was reflected on the sandy road and made greater. Men sickened and fell out of the ranks every mile we marched, until at last, when we reached Comite river, about ten miles from Baton Rouge, there were not more than 2,600 men fit for duty. Here a day of needed rest was taken and the men given an opportunity to wash their ragged clothes. Here General Breckinridge made a stirring speech to the Kentuckians, beginning, "My brave, noble, ragged Kentuckians." Before giving you an account of the battle of Baton Rouge, it is proper that I should tell you why we were sent to fight that battle, and the result it was hoped would be accomplished. Baton Rouge is one hundred and twenty miles above New Orleans, on the east side of the Mississippi, and forty miles above it Red river, which enters Western Louisiana near the Texas and Arkansas line, runs through and empties into the Mississippi. The mouth of Red river was blockaded. The Red river country, a rich agricultural region, not having been subjected to the ravages of war, was full of supplies much needed by the armies on the east side of the Mississippi, for the country on the east side had been pretty well drained of cattle, corn, forage, sugar, molasses and salt. There were many steamers in Red river ready to bring out supplies as soon as the blockade should be removed. At Baton Rouge was a force of the enemy, estimated at 4,000 to 5,000 strong, and four or five gunboats. If the enemy's forces at Baton Rouge could be captured,

the Mississippi would be open nearly to New Orleans, and the navigation of Red river secured. General Breckinridge was therefore ordered to make the attack, and the Arkansas was ordered to co-operate by engaging the gunboats, it being believed she could drive them off, or at least by occupying their entire attention, render them unable to give protection and assistance to the land forces. On the afternoon of the 4th of August, General Breckinridge, having learned by messenger that the Arkansas had passed Bayou Sara, and would be at hand ready to co-operate at daylight next morning, ordered one day's rations cooked, and at 11 o'clock that night the command started for Baton Rouge. It was a rather dark starlit night. The march was slow, frequent halts being made, so that the men might not be fatigued. General Ben Hardin Helm's Kentucky brigade was in advance, and about 3 o'clock in the morning, when about a mile and a half from the enemy, and during a halt, an unfortunate accident (if I may so call it) occurred. We had no information that any of our friends were in our front, and when suddenly there came galloping down on us at full speed what, from the noise made by the horses' hoofs, seemed to be a regiment of cavalry, we naturally supposed it was an attack of the enemy, and for a few moments considerable confusion ensued, the men scattering to the right and left of the road and opening fire on the supposed enemy. It was a body of partizan rangers or mounted home guards, who had managed to get through to the front, and which stampeded on being halted and fired on by the enemy's pickets. When order was restored it was found that Brigadier-General Helm had been seriously wounded, his horse having reared and fallen on him. His Aid-de-Camp, Lieutenant Alex. Todd, was killed, as were several of the men, and Lieutenant-Colonel Caldwell, of the Ninth Kentucky, and Captain Roberts, of the Fourth Kentucky, were wounded. Two of the three guns of Cobbs' battery were disabled.

It was now nearly day, and the dispositions for attack promptly made, the command taking position in a single line to the right and left of the Baton Rouge and Greenwell Springs road. While the line was forming we could distinctly hear the reveille of the enemy. A field band was playing the "Grand March from Norma," and every note was borne clearly out to us in the still air of early morning. Soon the order to advance was given, and the troops moved rapidly forward through cornfields and gardens, over fences, around houses, quickly driving in the skirmishers and developing the enemy's line, behind which, when the fog cleared, we could

see a heavy reserve force. General Breckinridge had formed the command into two divisions, the left being placed under the command of Brigadier-General Daniel Ruggles, and the right under Brigadier-General Charles Clarke. The battle was opened by Ruggles' division, which encountered the enemy strongly posted in a wood in front of a regimental camp. Semmes' Louisiana battery, attached to this division, was splendidly managed, and fought well up with the infantry, using grape and canister at close quarters with fine effect. Clarke's division now closed in on the enemy, who found the fire too hot, and he slowly retired through the first encampment, taking position in front of the second encampment, and being reinforced by the reserves. Owing to the broken nature of the ground and the obstructions, the line had, in advancing, become considerably deranged and disconnected, but as soon as it was adjusted it was thrown forward on the forces posted in front of the second encampment. Here the first determined and obstinate resistance was met. The contest was warmly maintained for a considerable time, probably an hour, and our losses were heavy. Colonel Allen, one of Ruggles' brigadiers, was wounded, his brigade was repulsed and fell back in confusion. Colonel Thompson, commanding the other brigade of Ruggles' division, was wounded leading a charge. Colonel Thomas H. Hunt, who succeeded to the command of Helm's brigade when General Helm was disabled, was wounded, and many regimental and company officers killed and wounded. Inch by inch the enemy was driven back, and the left of the army had reached the second encampment, when suddenly the right began to fall back. It was said to be in obedience to General Clark's orders, and Colonel John A. Buckner, now in command of Helm's brigade, rode along his line directing his men to retire to a ravine a short distance in the rear, and form there. The order to retire was unexpected and not understood, and the movement was made in some disorder, but the men quickly rallied in the ravine. Just as the line fell back General Clarke was badly, and it was supposed mortally, wounded. The enemy did not follow, but took advantage of his opportunity to change his line somewhat, shortening it, and retiring his left to the woods in front of his third encampment. Clarke's division was now moved a short distance to the left, being joined on its left by Thompson's brigade of Ruggles' division. The whole line was moved forward across a road parallel with the river, and now became exposed to a sharp fire from the gunboats. The enemy was in front of the third encampment, which was in the edge of town and near the arsenal.

General Breckinridge rode along the line and was greeted with enthusiasm. The men felt that the decisive moment had arrived, that victory was theirs. As the order "forward" was given, above the roar of the enemy's guns could be heard that clear, shrill, not-to-be-described cheer, called by the Federals the "Rebel yell." On moved the line unchecked by the heavy fire it met, closer and closer it came, until it seemed that there would be work for the bayonet, when suddenly the Federal line broke, panic-stricken, and, in a confused mass, fled to the river, to the shelter and protection of the gunboats. General Breckinridge had been anxiously listening for the sound of the Arkansas' guns. It was now 10 o'clock. Had she done her part the enemy was ours. But the heavy fire from the gunboats on our position was evidence that she had not arrived. Orders were therefore given to burn the camps, and the command retired a short distance out of reach of the gunboat fire and remained waiting, anxiously waiting, for the Arkansas. Late in the afternoon news of her fate reached General Breckinridge, and the little army moved back to its camp on Comite river. Just before daylight, when the Arkansas had reached a point some four miles above Baton Rouge, a serious break occurred in her machinery and her engine refused to work. Finding her drifting helplessly, her commander, Lieutenant Stevens, moved her to the shore and every effort was made to repair the damage, but without success. In the meanwhile negroes had conveyed word to the enemy her whereabouts and her condition. An easy capture was anticipated, and two gunboats were sent to bring her in. But the Arkansas was not destined to become a trophy of her foes. General Van Dorn, in his report to the Secretary of War, described her destruction in language so graphic that I quote it here: "On the cautious approach of the enemy, who kept at a respectful distance, Lieutenant Stevens landed the crew, cut her from her moorings, fired her with his own hands, and turned her adrift down the river. With every gun shot, our flag floating from her bow, and not a man on board, the Arkansas bore down upon the enemy and gave him battle. Her guns were discharged as the flames reached them, and when her last shot was fired the explosion of the magazine ended the brief but glorious career of the Arkansas. It was beautiful, said Lieutenant Stevens, while tears stood in his eyes, to see her when abandoned by commander and crew and dedicated to sacrifice, fighting the battle on her own hook."

About a week after the battle, Baton Rouge was evacuated and the forces there returned to New Orleans. The Mississippi river

was now open nearly to New Orleans. Vast quantities of army supplies were brought from Red river and distributed from points on the east side of the Mississippi. Steamboat communication with the trans-Mississippi was re-established. Every result hoped for in the battle of Baton Rouge had been accomplished, save only the capture of the forces there.

Telegrams from General Lee's Headquarters in September, 1864.

September 16, 1864.

Brigadier-General JOHN GREGG, *via Chaffin's Bluff*:

Telegram received. Endeavor to ascertain nature of reported movement of the enemy, as also their strength, and of what composed.

W. H. TAYLOR, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

September 16, 1864.

Governor Z. B. VANCE, *Raleigh, North Carolina*:

Twenty-six hundred muskets have been sent to you, and orders have been issued for one thousand to be sent from Salisbury.

R. E. LEE, *General.*

Official: W. H. TAYLOR,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA,
17th September, 1864.

General J. A. EARLY, *Winchester, Virginia*:

A deserter reports arrival here of Eighth corps under General Lew Wallace. General Wallace is said to be here. Is report correct?

R. E. LEE.

PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA, 17th September, 1864.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, *Richmond, Virginia*:

W. B. Swittell, Company E, Fourth North Carolina regiment infantry, is presumed to be with his command in Early's corps in the Valley. Nothing is known of his case here.

R. E. LEE, *General.*

Official: W. H. TAYLOR,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Editorial Paragraphs.

OUR JUNE NUMBER being necessarily delayed by the absence of the Secretary and other causes beyond our control, we decided to combine it with the July number. Our subscribers lose nothing either in the quantity or the quality of matter by the combining of these two numbers under one cover, and we are sure that they will not complain.

RENEWALS ARE STILL IN ORDER, and we would beg our friends to see that their neighbors whose time has expired renew their subscriptions. We can now send back numbers, and subscribers would do well to complete their sets *at once*, as we may not be able to do so when they want them.

And we earnestly beg the large number of subscribers whose time expires with this number to send on their renewals promptly.

GENERAL A. T. HAWTHORNE, of Marshall, Texas. has been appointed our General Agent for Texas and Arkansas. General Hawthorne was a gallant soldier in the Trans-Mississippi Department, and is too well known in that region to need any commendation from us. We know that he will receive a cordial welcome from his comrades and other friends of the cause, and we trust that he will not only enroll a number of members, but will secure much material for a true history of the Trans-Mississippi Department of the Confederacy.

REV. H. S. BURRAGE, OF PORTLAND, MAINE, and Rev. Dr. King, of Boston, favored us with a visit in May, and we had much pleasure in going over with them portions of the battlefields around Richmond, and in "fighting our battles over again" in a peaceable and fraternal way.

Captain Burrage, since his return home, has written in his paper (*Zion's Advocate*) a series of very interesting sketches on some of the movements in the campaign of 1864, in which he participated. We could wish that more of "our friends the enemy" would visit us, for many mistakes on both sides will never be corrected unless by personal intercourse and friendly discussion.

"MEMORIAL DAY" AT WINCHESTER must have been a grand affair, and we were very much disappointed at being unable to fulfil our purpose of being present. As the 6th of June fell on Sunday this year, the 5th was observed as "Memorial Day" and the Maryland monument was unveiled with imposing ceremonies. The Governor of Virginia (Colonel F. W. M. Holliday), whose "empty sleeve" rendered him especially worthy to grace the occasion, the "Confederate States Army and Navy Society of Maryland," the Fifth Maryland regiment from Baltimore, a number of

Virginia military companies, and an immense concourse of people, estimated at 15,000, were present.

An appropriate address of welcome by Governor Holliday was suitably responded to by Mayor Latrobe, of Baltimore. The orator of the day was Spencer E. Jones, Esq., of Maryland, who during the war was a gallant private in the "Maryland Line," and whose oration seems to have given the highest satisfaction to all who heard it.

Touching scenes of the occasion were the presentation by Governor Holliday of Mrs. Jackson and her daughter, Miss Julia, to the veterans of the old Stonewall Brigade who were present, and the reception by General B. T. Johnson of the flag of the First Maryland (Federal) regiment, which was captured at Front Royal May 23, 1862, by one of his men, and was now sent by its custodian, Miss Nannie McKay, in whose presence it was captured, to be returned to Colonel Kenly, who, despite the terrible wound he received that day, still survives, for his gallant First Maryland (Federal) regiment.

The whole affair seems to have been a splendid success. The monument, which is erected in the "Maryland section" of Stonewall cemetery is described as being very beautiful and appropriate, and certainly reflects credit on all who had part in devising or executing this tribute to the heroic "boys in gray" of Maryland.

GENERAL I. M. ST. JOHN was born in Georgia, not in New York, as we erroneously stated in our last issue. His father had been residing in New York for some years, and we were thus led into the error. We have received a very fine photograph of him, taken during the war, and prize it very highly as handing down the features of one of the most loyal Confederates, one of the most accomplished gentlemen, one of the truest friends, and one of the sincerest Christians whom we ever knew.

WILLIAM MAHL, General Superintendent of the Louisville and Cincinnati Short Line and the L. C. and Lexington railway, placed us under obligations for courtesies, cordially and politely extended, when several weeks ago we had occasion to pass over his admirably managed roads.

DURING A RECENT VISIT to Louisville and Lexington, Kentucky, we found it very pleasant to meet in the former city Major W. O. Dod, President; Major E. H. McDonald, Secretary, and Hon. H. W. Bruce, an active member, of the Louisville Branch of our Society; and in the latter city, G. W. Ranck, Secretary of the Kentucky Historical Society; Major H. B. McClellan, formerly of General J. E. B. Stuart's staff, and Captain C. H. Morgan, formerly of General John H. Morgan's staff, and to receive from them all, not only personal courtesies, but assurances of valuable help in our great work. Judge Bruce, Major Dod, Major McClellan, and Captain Morgan all promised us papers which will prove of great interest and real historic value.

Literary Notices.

O'Hara and His Elegies. By George W. Ranck, Lexington, Kentucky.

We are indebted to the accomplished author for a copy of this beautiful little volume, which is in every sense a literary gem.

The biographical sketch of O'Hara, tracing his life from his birth in Danville, Kentucky, through his career as politician, editor, soldier, in Mexico and in the Confederate service (where he served with great distinction as Colonel of the Twelfth Alabama regiment, and on the staff of General Albert Sidney Johnston and General John C. Breckinridge), and his career after the war until his death in 1867, is admirably done, and shows the author a master of this style of writing. And no competent critic can read the two exquisite poems given as specimens—"The Bivouac of the Dead" and "The Old Pioneer"—without pronouncing them gems of the first water, and concurring with Mr. Ranck in the very high estimate he places upon the genius of the author.

We are also indebted to Mr. Ranck for a splendid photograph of Colonel O'Hara, which we will place in our gallery of Confederate soldiers, and doubly prize as the counterpart of a gallant soldier and gifted child of genius and song.

Jackson's Valley Campaign. By Colonel William Allan, late Chief of Ordnance, Second corps A. N. V. With full maps by Captain Jed. Hotchkiss. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

We have just received, through the courtesy of the author, a copy of this every-way model book. After one has read the many so-called "histories" or biographies bearing on the late war, in which the writers rush into print without either the material or the industry to be reasonably accurate in their statement of facts, it is really refreshing to read this superb book. Colonel Allan has used the utmost diligence in verifying his statements, has studied the official reports and other documents on *both* sides, and has produced a book which will stand *as the authority* on that brilliant campaign which made "Stonewall" Jackson and his "foot cavalry" famous for all time.

Colonel Allan's style is clear, forcible and interesting, and one rises from the perusal of his narrative with the full conviction that he has been reading not romance, but history. Soldiers who fought on the other side will be struck with the absence of all partizanry, the freedom of the book from any harsh epithets, and the calm, historic spirit in which it is written.

The maps, prepared by Major Jed. Hotchkiss, of Jackson's staff—one of the very best topographical engineers which the war produced—are very valuable, and we do not hesitate to say that no one, North or South, who wishes to know the truth concerning this campaign, can afford to be without this invaluable history. We need scarcely add that the volume, in type, paper, binding, etc., is gotten up in the beautiful style for which Lippincott & Co. are famous.

"Brown University in the Civil War." By Henry Sweetser Burrage.

We are indebted to the accomplished author for a copy of this well written and beautifully gotten up book, and place it upon our shelves as an important chapter of the "war between the States."

It gives an introduction on "The University in Relation to the Rebellion"; a chapter of "Biographies of Students who Died in the Service or from Disease Contracted in the Service"; an account of "The Memorial Tablet in Manning Hall," and a "Roll of Students, Graduates and Non-Graduates, who Served in the Army and Navy of the United States during the Rebellion."

There were in the service in all capacities during the war two hundred and sixty-six of the old students, and of these twenty-one were killed or died from wounds or disease contracted in the service. We have said that the book is admirably gotten up (albeit there are, of course, sentiments which we utterly repudiate, and phrases which we would fain hope our friend Major Burrage would modify if he had written in 1880 instead of 1868), and we would rejoice to see such a volume for every college and university in the land.

We were very much struck by one statement, as illustrating the odds against which the South fought: *Brown University not only continued its regular sessions but, had in attendance more than its average of students during the whole war.* This was probably true of other Northern colleges; while nearly every college at the South was closed, and its professors and students enlisted en masse in the armies of the Confederacy.

"*The University Memorial.*" By Reverend John Lipscomb Johnson, B. A.

It is a singular coincidence that at the very time we received the volume concerning Brown University, we also received from our old college friend, the author, this splendid tribute to the alumni of the University of Virginia, who fell in the Confederate service. Alas! instead of twenty-one, this death-roll contains the names and brief biographies of one hundred and ninety-eight alumni of our noble University, who marched forth cheerfully to defend what they believed the cause of constitutional freedom, and laid their lives a willing sacrifice on the altar of "the land they loved." And even this long roll, because of imperfect records, is not complete, and it is believed that at least two hundred and seventy-five of our alumni fell in the great struggle.

Unfortunately there has been made out no roll of old students of the University who served in the Confederate army, but it is confidently believed that fully three-fourths of those who were of military age volunteered the first year of the war.

We regret that we have now only space to add that Mr. Johnson has done his work with skilful hand and tender touch, and has produced a book that deserves a place in every library. Copies may be procured of the author, Professor John L. Johnson, University of Mississippi, Oxford, Mississippi.

Scribner's Monthly and *St. Nicholas* continue to excel in beautiful illustrations and interesting, varied and valuable matter; every month bringing both grown people and little folks under renewed obligations for these superb magazines.
